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INSTITUTIONALISM, LEGITIMACY, AND FACT-FINDING
IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
MATTHEW W. SWINEHART*
ABSTRACT

Efforts to reform investor-state dispute settlement with an
investment court promise to elevate the role of institutions in
dispute resolution. The goal of this renewed campaign for institutionalism is to enhance both the legitimacy of arbitratorsas individual
decision-makers and the legitimacy of legal interpretation.But these
reform efforts ignore another core aspect of legitimacy-the legitimacy
of the fact-finding process. Ignoring this aspect of legitimacy is a
significant oversight, as treaty authors, disputingparties, and practitioners all remain dissatisfied with fact-finding quality and with
internationallaw's continued failure to address the factual complexity
of today's disputes. Both theory and experience with institutionalism
in existing systems predict that an investment court-with a standing
administrative apparatus, a standing first-instance tribunal, and a
standing appellate mechanism-cannot address this dissatisfaction.
At best, an investment court will have only marginal effects on factfinding. At worst, it will become a potential source of unreliablefactfinding practices and serve only to increase the cost and length of the
process. This Article cautions investment-court proponents to consider
the aspect of legitimacy that they have missed and points them to
an alternative, rules-based approach that would make changes to
the evidentiary rules that govern the production, testing, and evaluation of evidence. A rules-based approach offers the opportunity to
promote fact-finding practices that increase quality, to discourage

practices that do not, and to support consistency and predictabilityall without requiring wholesale reform or degrading efficiency. The
Article concludes with two rules-based strategies: the establishment
of analytical frameworks to increase adjudicator accountability and
engagement with the factual record and the appointment of subjectmatter experts as adjudicators to inject expertise directly into the
decision-makingprocess in factually complex disputes.

* Matthew Swinehart is the Director of the Office of International Financial Markets
at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The views expressed here are the author's own and
not necessarily the views of the Department of the Treasury or the United States government. The author thanks Freya Baetans, Andrea Bjorklund, Christopher Bradley, Susan
Franck, Jared Hubbard, Meg Kinnear, William Park, Bruno Simma, John Yoo, and the par-

ticipants of the Oct. 2017 conference on the Legitimacy of Unseen Actors in International
Dispute Resolution at Leiden University in The Hague.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The European Union's recent efforts to reform investor-state
dispute settlement with an investment court-like their many
predecessors over the years-promise to elevate the role of institutions
and institutional actors in resolving investment disputes.1 The goal
1. See, e.g., Investment Provisions in the EU-CanadaFree Trade Agreement (CETA),
at 1 (Feb. 2016), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doelib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5AL-4JEN] (promising a "more ...
institutionalised system"). Thomas
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of this renewed campaign for institutionalism is to enhance both
the legitimacy of arbitrators as individual decisionmakers, by reducing
conflicts and apparent and actual bias, and the legitimacy of the
legal interpretation process, by providing mechanisms to correct
errors and increase the consistency and predictability of legal rules. 2
But the investment-court movement ignores a third and no less
fundamental aspect of legitimacy-the legitimacy of the fact-finding
process. Ignoring this aspect of legitimacy is at odds with the outsized
contribution of fact-finding to the overall legitimacy of international
law.3 Parties to investment arbitrations and the practitioners who
represent them-those in the trenches of actual disputes-know the
critical importance of fact-finding processes capable of producing
quality outcomes without undue costs to efficiency. 4 They also know
that quality and efficiency in fact-finding depend above all on the
capacity of a decisionmaker to handle the ever-increasing factual
complexity of today's disputes, including with respect to one particular
source of facts: expert evidence.
That type of evidence, once rarely seen in international disputes, is
now a dominant feature of modern international dispute resolution.'
International adjudicators rely on expert evidence to understand
highly complex subjects, often far outside the domain of legal training.
They use it to calculate the amount of damages owed to aggrieved
investors,6 evaluate the scientific bases of environmental and health

Walde has traced the idea of an appellate mechanism for investor-state disputes, for instance, back to at least 1991. See David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for Review of
Arbitral Decisions in Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSN'L L. 39, 40 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Investment in TTIP and Beyond-The Path for Reform, at 6-9 (2015),
[https://perma.cc/
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/docib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF
K6MC-BVV6].
3. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, What Are InternationalJudges For? The Main Functions of
InternationalAdjudication, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION

158, 166 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2014) ("Finding facts is as essential as identifying
the law."); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 304 (1997) (arguing that the legitimacy of the
European Commission of Human Rights "depend[s] in large part on [its] ability to generate
an accurate factual record"); see also Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellec-

tual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1672 (1998) ("[E]pistemic nonarbitrariness in the
process of 'finding' scientifically discerned facts is a necessary condition of the practical
legitimacy of a decision that relies on that fact-finding.").
4. See infra Part I.
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. See, e.g., Venez. Holdings B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/27, Award, ¶¶ 265-70 (Oct. 9, 2014), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/
ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C256/DC4952_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/39NN-6ZAM].
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regulations, 7 draw international boundaries,8 and apportion natural
resources. 9 Expert evidence is routinely the determinative consideration in the highest profile investment arbitrations (like Philip Morris's
challenge to Uruguay's plain-packaging rules for cigarettes) 0 and
other international disputes (like the arbitration between China
and the Philippines over territorial claims in the South China Sea)."
It is also critical even when liability is conceded, and the only contested
issue is the amount of damages owed to an investor. 12

Despite this reality, international courts and tribunals have failed
to adapt to the critical influence of expert evidence in today's disputes,
often leading to the use of unreliable expert evidence, unfair rejection
of evidence that is reliable, and opaque and confused attempts to
resolve conflicting evidence.' 3 These are, at base, symptoms of a lack
of intellectual rigor and engagement with the substance of the evidentiary record in international disputes. The modest reforms made thus
far to fact-finding practices have wrought little improvement, and the
usual methods of fact-finding continue to disappoint disputing parties,
practitioners, and treaty authors alike.
Against that backdrop, the question raised by an investment court
becomes: if such a court is intended as a response to a general
legitimacy deficit in investment arbitration, will it address this
specific concern about the legitimacy of fact-finding? The answer, very
likely, is no. To be sure, today's investment-court movement is in
its early days, with no investment court yet in operation under the
agreements that the European Union (EU) has negotiated with a
handful of treaty partners. 4 But there is already reason to believe that
15
an investment court cannot remedy this dilemma.

7. See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award
(July 14, 2006), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.orgficsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C5/DC507_En.pdf
[httpsJ/perma.cc/WZD5-V6ZZ].
8. See, e.g., Philippines v. China, PCA Case Repository 2013-19, ¶ 133 (2016).
9. See, e.g., Indus Waters Kishenganga Arb. (Pak. v. India), PCA Case Repository
2011-01 (2013).
10. Philip Morris Brands Sdrl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7,
Award, ¶ 9 (July 8, 2016).
11. Philippines,PCA Case Repository 2013-19, ¶ 2.
12. See, e.g., Venez. Holdings B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/27, Award, ¶¶ 265-70 (Oct. 9. 2014), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/
ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C256/DC4952_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZT86-7UB2].
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. As of Aug. 2019, the EU had signed four investment protection agreements that
contemplate an investment court mechanism, with Canada, Mexico, Singapore, and
Vietnam.

See

SONALI CHOWDHRY

ET AL.,

THE

EU-JAPAN

ECONOMIC

PARTNERSHIP

AGREEMENT 18 (2018), http:/fbruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/EXPOSTU201860
3880_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2FH-EZN6].
15. See infra Part II.
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This Article looks to the three most viable arguments that an
investment court will improve fact-finding quality: (1) that an investment court's higher degree of independence will free decisionmakers
to decide cases based on their own views of the facts rather than the
views of the disputing parties; (2) that an investment court, especially
the introduction of an appellate tribunal, will increase the consistency
and predictability of fact-finding practices; and (3) that the standing
nature of an investment court will provide decision-makers with
the opportunity to become subject-matter experts themselves in
frequently encountered topics, better able to tackle the factual
complexity of today's disputes. Examining these arguments with the
help of rational design, judicial politics, epistemology, and other
scholarship, the conclusion here is that an investment court will have
only marginal effects on fact-finding, possibly negative on net.
With respect to the first argument, theories of rational design
and judicial politics suggest that an investment court will exhibit
increased independence.1 6 But those theories, coupled with epistemology research on the use of knowledge in legal decision-making, predict
that the relative independence of an investment court will have
unintended and negative consequences on the production and testing
of evidence." Independent decisionmakers are more likely to engage
in what this Article identifies as "self-reliance" in the production and
testing of evidence, a practice that deemphasizes party participation
and depresses the quality of a factual record.18
As for the second argument, scholarship on the creation and
influence of precedent and studies of judicial behavior predict that an
investment court will not instill greater consistency and predictability
in fact-finding. 19 The assumptions underlying the introduction of an
appellate court in international law, whatever their merit when
applied to legal interpretation, do not hold in the case of fact-finding.
This is so because evidentiary frameworks are broader and more
general than substantive legal rules. Decision-makers follow flexible
norms in fact-finding and do not engage in even "soft" rule creation
as might be done in legal interpretation, and the scope of appellate
review of factual questions is highly circumscribed rather than de
novo as with legal questions.20
With respect to the third and final argument, an investment
court is unlikely to mean that decision-makers reach better factual
determinations by accruing subject-matter expertise in the course of
16. See infra Part H.A.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra Part I.B.
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their duties.21 This is the prediction of empirical and conceptual
studies in epistemology and judicial behavior, given the relatively
low frequency of disputes found in any particular mechanism, the lack
of an adequate substitute for the rigorous and systematic training
that is typically necessary to impart technical expertise, and the highly
specialized nature of expertise necessary to provide insights into
complex fact questions.
To confirm this conceptual analysis, the Article surveys the effects
of institutionalism on existing mechanisms. It finds that the same
elements that an investment court would introduce-a standing
administrative apparatus, a standing first-instance tribunal, and a
standing appellate mechanism-have no demonstrated capacity to
improve fact-finding when employed in existing dispute settlement
mechanisms. That is the lesson from a diverse array of mechanisms,
including the International Court of Justice (ICJ); the World Trade
Organization (WTO); the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal; the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS); and state-to-state, investorstate, and commercial arbitrations.
The inability of institutionalism to resolve concerns about factfinding is a reason for reformers to pause and consider whether less
wholesale changes could remedy at least some perceived inadequacies
of existing mechanisms. When it comes to the specific case of factfinding considered here, states have a powerful lever in the form of
evidentiary rules-the provisions in treaties, institutional protocols,
and arbitration agreements that govern the production, testing, and
evaluation of evidence. Targeted changes to those rules could work to
address shortcomings of existing mechanisms, including the lack of
rigor and substantive engagement with evidence.22 Unlike reforms
based on institutionalism, a rules-based approach would also allow
states to engage in incremental and iterative reform, choosing initial
rule changes that may meet their objectives and permitting adjustments as needed over time. Rule changes are relatively easy to
alter or reverse if they prove ineffective or unworkable. There is no
upfront commitment to fundamental reforms as with the creation of
an investment court.
This Article sets out two categories of rules-based reforms: the
establishment of analytical frameworks to increase adjudicator
accountability and engagement with the factual record and the
appointment of subject-matter experts as adjudicators to inject
expertise directly into the decision-making process in factually
complex disputes. 3 Approaches in the first category-analytical
21.
22.
23.

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Parts II, III.
See infra Part III.
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frameworks-could both clarify expectations for fact-finding, allowing
decision-makers greater freedom to reject unreliable party-presented
evidence and impose costs on decision-makers who stray from
those expectations, ratcheting up decision-maker accountability. In so
doing, analytical frameworks can encourage practices that increase
quality, discourage practices that do not, and promote consistency
and predictability. Approaches in the second category-appointing
subject-matter experts as adjudicators-could increase the intellectual
capacity of decisionmakers in confronting complex factual questions
and increase engagement with the substance of the factual record.
This Article shows that an investment court is inadequate to the
task of improving fact-finding and makes the case for a rules-based
approach in three parts. Part I identifies quality and efficiency as
the factors underlying the legitimacy of fact-finders, outlines the
critical role that expert evidence plays in fact-finding, and explains
how international dispute settlement has failed to meet the expectations of stakeholders in the fact-finding process.
Part II then examines the three most viable arguments as to why
an investment court might improve fact-finding. Addressing the first
argument, Part II.A ranks the EU's investment court on a numerical
scale against several other prominent dispute settlement mechanisms,
confirming that a court is likely to exhibit a relatively high degree
of independence. Theory predicts, however, that independence will
actually decrease the fact-finding performance of an investment
court. A survey of a wide variety of existing practices at the same
time appears to confirm what theory predicts.
Looking to the second argument, Part II.B constructs a three-part
model to show that differences between fact-finding and legal interpretation mean that a court will not improve the consistency and
predictability of evidentiary practices, even if it happens to improve
the consistency and predictability of legal interpretation as investment-court proponents forecast. And Part II.C reviews the third
argument, concluding that an investment court is no more likely to
impart technical, subject-matter expertise on decisionmakers than
today's investment arbitration mechanisms.
In response to the conclusion that an investment court will not
improve fact-finding in any of these ways, Part III identifies the
most promising rules-based alternatives. In considering reforms to
fact-finding practices, states and institutions can mix and match
options from this scalable menu and deploy them in any dispute
resolution mechanism.
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II. THE INADEQUACY OF FACT-FINDING PRACTICES IN
MODERN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

The EU is at the forefront of the investment-court movement, with
signed agreements that promise to institute such a mechanism with a
handful of trading partners, including Canada, Mexico, Singapore, and
Vietnam. 4 The EU has said that its overarching objective in creating
an investment court is to provide "fair and transparent dispute
resolution," "while ensuring a high level of protection for investments"
and preserving "the right of governments to regulate in the public
interest."2 5 On many occasions, it has framed the issue as simply one
of "legitimacy." 26
Looking beyond these general statements of intent, it is clear that
the motivation behind the EU's investment court, like many previous
efforts to improve investment arbitration, is limited to two specific
questions of legitimacy: the legitimacy of arbitrators as individual
decision-makers and the legitimacy of the legal interpretation
process.27 Little is said about the challenges facing fact-finding in
international law. 28
Before considering in this Article what the EU has ignored, it is
important to establish a baseline understanding about the current
state of fact-finding in international disputes and what a would-be
reformer of evidentiary practices ought to set out to achieve. The
24.

CHOWDHRY ET AL., supra note 14, at 18 (noting inclusion of an investment court

mechanism in EU agreements with Canada, Mexico, Singapore, and Vietnam). Negotiations
continue between the EU and Japan on investment protection and the processes for
settlement of investment disputes, while negotiation of the remainder of the EU-Japan
Economic Partnership Agreement has concluded on a separate track. EU-JapanInvestment

Negotiations (July 11, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/KG9P-YS4Y].
25.

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1888

See Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade

Agreement (CETA) Between Canada and the European Union and its Member States 2017 O.J. (L 11),
https:/eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22017X0114(01)&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/E56R-243K] [hereinafter Joint Interpretive Instrument on CETA]; see also,
Investment Provisions in the EU-CanadaFree Trade Agreement (CETA), supra note 1, at 12, 4 (highlighting a concern for fairness).
26. See, e.g., Investment in TTIP and Beyond-The Path for Reform, supra note 2, at 9
(highlighting a concern for "legitimacy").
27. See Jose E. Alvarez, To Court or Not to Court?, INST. FOR INT'L L. & JUST. (July 15,
2016), http://www.iilj.org/working-papers/to-court-or-not-to-court/ [https://perma.cc/HH2BUHUJ] (describing the general scope of the debate regarding investor-state arbitration reforms).
28. The lack of focus on fact-finding is not limited to the EU's reform process. See, e.g.,
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development., UNCTAD's Reform Package for the International Investment Regime 48 tbl.6 (2018). It is also not limited to contemporary commentators or designers of dispute settlement systems. As Durward Sandifer explained in his 1974
treatise on evidence in international disputes, "tribunals, as a rule, are preoccupied with the
determination of the substantive questions submitted for their decision at the expense of
matters of procedure, not infrequently with unfortunate results on the work of the tribunal."
DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 8-9 (1975).
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following identifies quality and efficiency as the factors that determine
the legitimacy of fact-finders, catalogs the critical influence of factfinding in international disputes-particularly with respect to expert
evidence-and reports on the continued failure of fact-finding in
international law to live up to expectations of treaty authors, disputing
parties, and practitioners alike.
A.

Quality and Efficiency as Determinants of
Fact-FindingLegitimacy

The emphasis of the investment-court movement on fairness,
transparency, and legitimacy corresponds to the consensus view
that the primary function of an international dispute settlement mechanism is to provide information about the facts and the law (and
specifically, in international commercial and investment arbitration,
to render an enforceable monetary award), and to do so in an unbiased
manner. 29 That consensus view also holds that, when a reformer
like the EU says that the intent behind its reforms is to increase
fairness, transparency, and legitimacy, the reformer means that it
hopes to increase the quality of the information that a mechanism's
decisions provide. 30
Because states are the makers of international law and the principal designers of dispute settlement mechanisms, it is their perception
of quality that primarily drives mechanism design. Each state, in its
role as a dispute settlement designer, will weigh quality to varying
degrees,3 1 and will do so based on a complex calculus that takes into
account the perceptions of other states, industry, non-governmental
organizations, and the general public.32 This calculus is all the more
29. Scholars who hold this view of the primary function of international dispute settlement have largely focused on state-to-state disputes. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals:A Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 208-09 (2008) (noting
consensus on the purpose of international dispute resolution); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-

Marie Slaughter, Why States CreateInternationalTribunals:A Response to Posner and Yoo,
93 CALIF. L. REV. 899, 931-36 (2005); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, JudicialIndependence
in InternationalTribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 17 (2005). The information function observed
in state-to-state disputes may, of course, work in parallel or in tandem with additional functions in other systems, such as the function of compensation commissions or investment tribunals, to provide compensation or other monetary award to injured parties. See David D.
Caron, InternationalClaims and CompensationBodies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INT'L

ADJUDICATION 279, 281 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2014); Gary Born, A New Generation
of InternationalAdjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 779 (2012).
30. See Susan D. Franck et al., Inside the Arbitrator'sMind, 66 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1128
(2017) (arguing that "integrity and quality" is "central to arbitration's legitimacy as a form
of dispute settlement" and noting that uncertainty about that quality has "created apprehension and debate" in the public discourse); Guzman, supra note 29, at 205.
31. See David D. Caron, Reputation and Reality in the ICSID Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction Between Annulment and Appeal, 7 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV.
L.J. 21, 49 (1992).
32. See id. at 49-50.
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difficult when popular government policy is at issue, large amounts
of money are at stake, or the claims raise sensitive geopolitical
concerns. 33
In addition to the question of design, the practical utility of a
dispute settlement mechanism once implemented also depends
primarily on the perceptions of state actors.34 A state's perception of
quality affects real-world behavior because the state will react to a
decision based on its beliefs about the decision's quality. 3 If a state
believes that a decision is of high quality, it will more readily alter its
behavior in response to the decision, such as by retaliating against the
losing party or by complying with an adverse decision.3 6 And, if a state
believes that a mechanism as a whole produces high-quality decisions,
it will more readily continue to support the mechanism, even though
the mechanism may produce decisions adverse to it in the future.37
There is a wide-ranging debate about the extent to which quality
and other characteristics of dispute settlement can affect the realworld responses of state actors, but there is core agreement that
increasing the quality of decisions improves the functioning-and
corresponds to heightened perceptions of legitimacy-of a dispute
settlement mechanism.
To recognize that the practical utility of international dispute
settlement rests primarily on the subjective perceptions of state
actors is not to say that all forms of international dispute settlement
lack objectively meaningful enforcement tools. With their respective
focuses on the rational, self-interested behavior of states and
adjudicators, rational design and judicial politics scholars emphasize
the lack of meaningful enforcement in international law. 38 But that
33. See id. at 51.
34. There are many ways to define the practical utility-or "effectiveness"-of a dispute
settlement mechanism. Rational design theorists, for example, define effectiveness by reference to some measure of compliance, either with substantive legal obligations or with decisions. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 29, at 209 (defining the effectiveness as a "tribunal's
ability to enhance compliance with the associated substantive obligation").
35. See id. at 206.
36. See id.
37. See Born, supra note 29, at 859-61, 868.
38. Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark Pollack have provided an excellent summary of these two
veins of scholarship, both within the domestic U.S. and international contexts. See Jeffrey
L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, The Judicial Trilemma, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. 225, 229-33 (2017).
The rational design literature does not view dispute settlement as capable of changing national interests because it understands international institutions as the products of states'
rational pursuits of their own interests, although state behavior may be affected because of
reputational and other costs to non-compliance. See, e.g., ANDREW T. GuzMAN, How
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 33-48 (2008) (arguing that states

are rational actors and that the reputational consequences of their actions factor into their
analysis of their own behaviors); Posner & Yoo, supra note 29, at 28 ("[Tribunals] cannot
issue judgments that run contrary to the interests of the parties to a dispute. If they do so,
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analysis centers on what Gary Born has called "first-generation"
mechanisms-including the Permanent Court of International
Justice, the ICJ, and ITLOS. 39 Investment arbitration and other
"second-generation" mechanisms are enforceable in domestic courts
through near-universally applicable treaties such as the New
York Convention and the treaty colloquially known as the "ICSID
Convention."4 0 Enforcement of arbitral awards in domestic courts
under these conventions is relatively effective.41 Even though this
ability to enforce international law decisions contributes to the
practical utility of investment arbitration, it is still correct to say that
the practical utility of investment arbitration depends primarily on
the perceptions of states. This is so partly because states do in some
cases have the ability to avoid the coercive reach of arbitral awards if
they wish to do so, partly because states have the ability to change or
abolish an existing mechanism if they are displeased with its results,
and partly because the fate and features of future mechanisms depend
on the views of states on existing mechanisms.
The perceptions of certain non-state actors about a mechanism's
quality will also affect the mechanism's practical utility, which in
turn may influence indirectly the choices of states in designing future
mechanisms. Unlike a state-to-state mechanism, an investor-state
mechanism, once created, has two distinct constituencies: investors,
who are potential users of mechanisms but have no direct role in their
design, and states, which are both designers and potential users of
the mechanism.42 Investors' perceptions of a mechanism's quality will
inform their decisions as to whether to use the mechanism to resolve
potential disputes, decisions that may significantly affect the practical
utility of a mechanism as they are the only parties that may invoke
the mechanism in most circumstances.43 An investor-state mechanism
their rulings will be ignored and states will use them less often."). The judicial politics literature focuses on adjudicators as rational actors who seek to maximize their utility within
the constraints of political and institutional environments. See generally Emilie M. HafnerBurton et al., Political Science Research on InternationalLaw: The State of the Field, 106
AM. J. INT'L L. 47 (2012). There are a number of other approaches and variations on approaches to the relationships among states, adjudicators, and institutions. Advocates of the
constructivist approach, for example, argue that dispute settlement can redefine state interests. See KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS,

RIGHTS 53 (2014) ("[International courts] influence governments through alliances with compliance constituencies, ever-changing groups of domestic and international actors that actively or tacitly support compliance with international law and [international court] rulings.").
39. See Born, supra note 29, at 857-58.
40. See id. at 857.
41. See id. It is true, however, that the scope of enforcement is narrow in some cases
because it is limited to assets outside a state's own borders. See id.
42.
43.

See id. at 857-58.
See id.

290

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:279

is of little or no utility if investors choose not to use it. The perceptions
of investors will also influence indirectly the design of future dispute
resolution mechanisms to the extent that states take them into
account.4 4
Quality is a critical determinant of a mechanism's legitimacy, but
it is not the only one. Elements that increase quality may also have
negative consequences on the efficiency-especially the cost and
length-of the dispute settlement process.45 In the design and use of
an investment dispute mechanism, then, states and investors must
"carefully weigh the benefits and costs" of elements that are intended
to increase quality.4 6
To put it another way, an element that ultimately makes a
decision-maker better-and more legitimate in the eyes of designers
and users-is one that contributes toward achieving what they view
as optimal outcomes in both quality and efficiency.4 And so when
it comes to the specific case of fact-finding, a better fact-finder is
more likely to achieve that optimization than others in the production,
testing, and evaluation of evidence.
B.

The CriticalRole of Expert Evidence in
InternationalDisputes

Whether a decision-maker is able to optimize quality and efficiency
in fact-finding to the liking of designers and users depends in large
part on its capacity to deal with one particular type of evidenceexpert witness testimony and other expert evidence. After little resort
to that evidence in the first two centuries of modern international
law, reliance on expert evidence has in the past forty years increased
dramatically as human activity itself has become more complex-more
scientific, more specialized-and international agreements have
tackled progressively more complex and technical issues.4 8 Today, the
outcome of an investment arbitration or any other international
dispute is very likely to depend on the conclusions that the decisionmaker reaches based on expert evidence. 49
44. See Caron, supra note 31, at 49-50.
45.
(2010).

See William W. Park, Arbitratorsand Accuracy, 1 J. INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 25, 27

46. See Franck et al., supra note 30, at 1171; see also Caron, supra note 31, at 49.
47. See Caron, supra note 31, at 49-51.
48. Matthew W. Swinehart, Reliability of Expert Evidence in InternationalDisputes, 38
MICH. J. INT'L L. 287, 290-302 (2017) (tracing the history of expert evidence in international
disputes from 1794 to 2016).
49. See, e.g., CAROLINE E. FOSTER, SCIENCE AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: EXPERT EVIDENCE, BURDEN OF PROOF AND
FINALITY 77 (2011); Kate Miles, Climate Change: Trading, Investing and the Interaction of
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International courts and tribunals rely on expert evidence from
a range of sources, including the testimony of expert witnesses,
adjudicators' own analysis of complex documentary evidence, and
input from specialized international organizations, or resort to
non-testifying specialists.50 Through expert evidence, international
adjudicators seek to understand highly complex subjects, often far
outside the domain of legal training. Decision-makers are called upon
to calculate damages using the valuation methods of professional
investors,5 1 to evaluate the bases of environmental and health
regulations relying on science and statistics,5 2 to draw international
boundaries using advanced mapping and geolocation technologies,"
and to apportion natural resources with the help of hydrologists
54
and engineers.

In whatever form it takes, expert evidence has a wide-ranging
and significant influence on decision-makers. It influences the
outcomes of relatively binary decisions (such as whether a disputing
party is liable under a particular claim),5 5 decisions of degree (such
as the amount of damages),5 6 and the tone, terminology, and assumptions of a decision,5 7 which may influence the resolution of future
disputes. It is, for those reasons, central to resolution of the highest
profile and most factually complex disputes, such as the arbitration

Law, Science and Technology, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW: BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS 155-56 (Bryan Mercurio & Kuei-Jung Ni eds.,

2014).
50. This Article uses the term "expert evidence" to mean evidence produced by a specialist or evidence produced by others in an attempt to substitute for evidence produced by
a specialist, not simply evidence formally designated as "expert evidence." See infra Part
II.A.
51. See, e.g., Venez. Holdings B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/27, Award, ¶ 404 (Oct. 9, 2014), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/
OnlineAwards/C256/DC4952_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/KUB4-CFXA].
52. See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶
442 (July 14, 2006), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C5/
DC507_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/YK25-Y5RE].
53. See, e.g., Philippines v. China, PCA Case Repository 2013-19 (2016).
54. See, e.g., Indus Waters Kishenganga Arb. (Pak. v. India), PCA Case Repository
2011-01,

55.

¶ V (2013).
See FOSTER, supra note 49, at 177.
See SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN

56.
INVESTMENT LAW 174 (2008).

WILLIAMS,

DAMAGES

IN

INTERNATIONAL

57. See Caroline E. Foster, New Clothes for the Emperor? Consultationof Experts by the
InternationalCourt of Justice, 5 J. INT'L DISP. SETILEMENT 139, 140 (2014).
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between China and the Philippines over territorial claims in the
South China Sea5 8 and Philip Morris's challenge to Uruguay's
plain-packaging rules for cigarettes.5 9
Despite these developments, international courts and tribunals
have largely failed to adapt to the rise of expert evidence. The
fundamental deficiency of international law in this regard is that
existing practices do not provide a framework to engage meaningfully
with the substance of that evidence. 60 Meaningful engagement with
a factual record at base requires the evaluation of that record's
reliability, but courts and tribunals too often rely on expert evidence
without doing that evaluation. 61 Even when they do examine reliability, their assessment routinely lacks rigor and transparency. 2
This neglect can lead to misuse of unreliable expert evidence, unfair
rejection of evidence that is reliable, and opaque and confused
attempts to resolve conflicting evidence.6 3 The role, if any, that experts
play, and the extent to which adjudicators comply with the prohibition
against outsourcing of their decision-making function or with requirements to state the reasons for a decision, all too often remain unclear.61
Adjudicators may also marshal vast amounts of expert evidence
simply as a way to lend credibility to an otherwise lackluster intellectual exercise.61
There have been efforts to reform fact-finding practices over the
years, including many that affect the handling of expert evidence. For
one, the mere existence of pre-established rules of evidence was once a
rarity in international law,66 but such rules became common decades
ago in both institutional protocols and international agreements. 67
Notable efforts like the "Redfern Schedule" for document production
requests 68 and the International Bar Association's 2010 Rules on
58. See Philippines,PCA Case Repository 2013-19 at ¶ 2.
59. See Philip Morris Brands Sbrl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 9 (July 8, 2016), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/
OnlineAwards/C1000/DC9012_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BDC-CJPG].
60. See Swinehart, supra note 48, at 302-17.
61. See id.
62. See FOSTER, supra note 49, at 133.
63. See Miles, supra note 49, at 160-61.
64.

GILLIAN M. WHITE, THE USE OF EXPERTS BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 13 (1965).

65.

See Christophe Bonneuil & Les Levidow, How Does the World Trade Organization

Know? The Mobilization and Staging of Scientific Expertise in the GMO Trade Dispute, 42
Soc. STUD. SCI. 75, 79 (2012).
66. See SANDIFER, supra note 28, at 35 (noting that the ICJ was once the exception to
the rule that international adjudication "requires new rules of procedure" for each dispute

or ad hoc tribunal).
67. See infra Part III.
68. See generallySam Luttrell & Peter Harris, Reinventing the Redfern, 33 J. INT'L ARB.
353 (2016).
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69
the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration are more recent
70
additions to the evidentiary practices of courts and tribunals. There
is also a clear trend in pending reforms toward greater specificity in
rulemaking, as illustrated recently in the proposed amendments to the
Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings of the International
71
Centre for Settlement of Investor Disputes (ICSID).
Past reforms have led to only modest changes, with evidentiary
rules remaining quite general and ineffective. 2 Few reforms have
73
improved decision-maker engagement with evidentiary substance,
and robust analysis of the reliability of evidence remains the
exception. 4 With respect to complex, technical, and scientific facts
in particular, "traditional methods of evaluating evidence" in international law remain, in a word, "deficient."The following analysis, in Part II of the Article, asks whether
the institution-enhancing features of the EU's investment court will
improve on these existing methods of fact-finding in investment
disputes. The conclusion here is that an investment court will not
resolve concerns with fact-finding practices, and so, Part III of the
Article will return to the topic of evidentiary rules outlined above
and identify strategies for improving fact-finding based on reforms to
those rules.

III. MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF
INSTITUTIONALISM ON FACT-FINDING

An answer to the question about the effects of institutionalism
on fact-finding must begin with an accounting of what is meant by
69. See INT'L BAR ASs'N, IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION (2010); 1999 IBA Working Party & 2010 IBA Rules of Evidence Review Subcommittee, Commentary on the Revised Text of the 2010 IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence
in International Arbitration 1-4 (2010), https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?
DocumentUid=DD240932-0E08-40D4-9866-309A635487C0 [https://perma.cc/FE43-ZQT5].
70. See Matthias Scherer, The Limits of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in
InternationalArbitration:Document Production Based on Contractualor Statutory Rights,

13 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 195, 195 (2010).
71. Compare ICSID Secretariat, Volume 2: Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID
Rules-Consolidated Draft Rules 42-43 (Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Working
Paper No. 1, 2018), with INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION,
REGULATIONS AND RULES: RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

(ARBITRATION RULES) 115-16 (2006).
72.

See SANDIFER, supra note 28, at 44-45.

73. See Swinehart, supra note 48, at 303.
74. See id.
75. See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 18,
108, ¶ 3 (Al-Khasawneh, J. & Simma, J., dissenting); see also Lucy Reed, ConfrontingComplexities in Fact-Findingand the Nature of Investor-State Arbitration, 106 AM. SOC'Y

INT'L

L. PROC. 233, 233 (2012) (arguing that decision-makers "can do a better job" in fact-finding
by taking steps to "control and mitigate complexities").
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the term institutionalism in general-and an accounting of how an
investment court represents a specific application of institutionalism.
In other words, what does an investment court change about the
institutional nature of investment arbitration, and what does it leave
intact? After answering those threshold questions, this Part will turn
to what institutionalism will mean for the fact-finding process in
investment disputes.
From many angles, the EU's investment court approach does
not concern itself with fact-finding practices whatsoever.7 6 The EU's
trade and investment agreement with Canada, the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), illustrates this point and is
representative of the EU's overall approach. CETA leaves unchanged
today's reliance on basic frameworks of evidentiary rules in traditional
investment or commercial arbitration." Those frameworks are for the
most part broad and general, imposing few constraints on a decisionmaker's choice of evidentiary sources, conduct of the evidence-gather7
ing process,8 and evaluation of evidence once gathered. " The
priority of these frameworks is to allow decision-makers to adapt to
the demands of each dispute.80
When it comes to expert evidence in particular, there is also no
indication that the EU and Canada intend for CETA to depart from
today's prevailing practices. Most dispute settlement mechanismsincluding investment and commercial arbitration, the WTO, ICJ,
ITLOS, and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal-allow adjudicators to
appoint their own experts and seek input from third-parties, including
international organizations. 81 Those mechanisms, with the exception
of the WTO, also expressly contemplate that the parties may appoint
their own experts and present the testimony of those experts at a
76. This observation is subject to future negotiation between the EU and Canada on the
details of the appellate tribunal and administrative apparatus. See August Reinisch, The
European Union and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: From Investor-State Arbitration to
a Permanent Investment Court, CIGI, Mar. 2016, at 22, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/
default/files/isa paper-series-no.2.pdf [https://perma.ccIY2RP-SRFE].
77. See generally Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., Oct. 30,
2016, arts. 8.18-8.45.
78. See, e.g., Anna Riddell, Evidence, Fact-Finding, and Experts, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 848, 849 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds.,
2014) ("At an international level, adjudicative bodies have traditionally been afforded a very
significant degree of freedom to ascertain the facts underlying their decisions."); Susan L.
Karamanian, Overstating the Americanization of InternationalArbitration: Lessons from

ICSID, 19 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 5, 28 (2003) ("Like many rules of international arbitrations, the ICSID rules lack detailed evidentiary standards."); SANDIFER, supra note 28, at 9
("[No rule of evidence thus finds more frequent statement in the cases than the one that
international tribunals are not 'bound to adhere to strict judicial rules of evidence.' ").
79. See SERENA FORLATI, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: AN ARBITRAL
TRIBUNAL OR A JUDICIAL BODY? 72-77 (2014).
80.

See SANDIFER, supra note 28, at 15.

81.

See Riddell, supra note 78, at 856-57.
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hearing, with the other party and the adjudicators able to ask
questions, subject to the approval and control of the adjudicators. 2
Even with this wholesale carryover of existing fact-finding
practices, it is possible that the changes that CETA would makenamely, the introduction of elements that would establish an investment court-could affect the quality and efficiency of fact-finding.
Both the EU and Canada have cast CETA's investment court
provisions, in part, as an attempt to expand the influence that institutions and institutional actors exercise over decision-making-that is,
to expand the "institutionalization" or "judicialization" of investment
dispute resolution. 83 It would do so through the introduction of at
least three new elements: (1) a standing administrative institution; (2)
a standing tribunal to decide disputes in the first instance; and
(3) a standing appellate tribunal to review first-instance decisions for
error.84
82. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 63-65, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; U.N. COMM. ON INT'L TRADE LAw, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION
RULES: UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENcY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION arts. 27-28 (2013); PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION RULES
11-12 (2012); INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 71, at 116.
83. See, e.g., ChapterSummaries, Gov. CANADA, http://www.international.gc.ca/tradecommerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciauxlagr-ace/ceta-aecg/chaptersummary-

resumechapitre.aspx?lang=eng#a8 [https://perma.cc/ZC68-W7C6]; Investment Provisions
in the EU-CanadaFree Trade Agreement (CETA), supra note 1, at 1 (asserting that Canada
and the EU have: strengthened governments' right to regulate; moved to a permanent, transparent and institutionalized dispute-settlement tribunal; revised the process for the selection of tribunal members; set out additional ethical requirements for tribunal members; and
agreed to an appeal system). The parties issued a Joint Interpretative Instrument at CETA's
signing, explaining that the inspiration for these efforts include the "principles of public judicial systems in the European Union and its Member States and Canada, as well as and
[sic] international courts such as the International Court of Justice and the European Court
of Human Rights." Joint Interpretative Instrument on CETA, supra note 25, at $ 6. Separately, the EU has indicated that an appellate tribunal "could be modelled largely on the
institutional set-up of the WTO Appellate Body, with some adaptations both to make it specific for [resolution of investment disputes], and in light of experience in the WTO." See Investment in TTIP and Beyond-The Path for Reform, supra note 2, at 6-9. At the same time,
the words "court" and "judge," common in earlier EU descriptions of the proposals, do not
appear in the signed CETA text. See CtLINE LtVESQUE, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
PROPOSAL FOR AN INVESTMENT COURT SYSTEM: OUT WITH THE OLD, IN WITH THE NEW? 3

(2016), https://www.cigionline.org/publications/european-commission-proposal-investmentcourt-system-out-old-new [https://perma.cc/3QKA-L3UB].
84.

See, e.g., Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 77, at arts.

8.27, 8.28 (concerning the "Constitution of the Tribunal" and ), and 8.28 ("Appellate Tribunal"). Because the terms "institutionalization" and "judicialization" have no consistent usage, this Article will not dwell on subtle distinctions between them or other words used to
describe the move away from purely ad hoc arbitration and toward mechanisms that more

closely resemble domestic courts. See Michael Wood, Choosing Between Arbitration and a
Permanent Court: Lessons from Inter-State Cases, 32 ICSID REV. 1, 2 (2017) (noting that the
similarities of arbitral and judicial mechanisms are "perhaps harder to state, but ... more
significant than the differences"); Gilbert Guillaume, The Future of InternationalJudicial
Institutions, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 848, 859 (1995) ("The term 'judicial institutions' may be
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The first institutional element of the CETA investment court is
the introduction of a standing institution, one that is likely to serve
an administrative function.8 5 If it is to be anything like existing
institutions in the investment dispute context-such as ICSID,
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC)-the CETA institution will offer services
to disputing parties, supply a set of default procedural rules, and
employ registries, secretariats, legal officers, or other staff.86 "Institutional" arbitration is distinguishable from "ad hoc" arbitration, which
is generally conducted without such an authority; although the parties
to an ad hoc dispute may decide to borrow an institution's procedural
rules.87
The second institutional element of CETA's investment court is
the establishment of a standing first-instance tribunal, envisioned
as a judicial body in the sense that, like the ICJ, ITLOS, and the WTO,
it would involve decision-makers who are part of the institution,
appointed for terms, and vested with authority to resolve disputes
arising from future events. 88 The tribunal will consist of fifteen
"members" who will hear disputes as part of randomly selected
"divisions" of three, and who will serve five or six-year terms, renewable once. 89 This structure departs from existing modes of investment
understood restrictively as applying only to courts established on a permanent basis and
rendering, in law, judgments binding on the parties. One may also give to these terms a
broader meaning and consider that arbitration, or at least certain kinds of arbitration, is a
form of judicial settlement . . . . But international bodies do not always fit neatly into academic categories."); see also David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of InternationalDispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L.
104, 128 (1990) ("In both law and science one can undertake to construct a taxonomy; but in
law the categories that can be said to be naturally apparent flow from changing circumstances such as the organization of society and the ability of those within the society to interact."). The same terminology used to describe the elements of an investment court is occasionally used to describe a transition in international arbitration from a relatively informal system (where the parties to a dispute establish procedural and other rules for the purpose of that dispute) to one that is more procedurally complex and expensive. See Bernard
Hanotiau, InternationalArbitration in a Global Economy: The Challenges of the Future, 28

J. INT'L ARB. 89, 99 (2011); Jan Paulsson, Introduction, 1 ARB. INT'L 2, 2-5 (1985) (describing
the effects of an increase in litigant sophistication); Alan Redfern, Stemming the Tide of Judicialisation,2 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 21, 21-24 (2011); Posner & Yoo, supra note

29, at 9 (describing "judicialisation" as a process whereby dispute settlement becomes more
regularized because certain procedural and other rules are not renegotiated from dispute to

dispute).
85.

See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 77, at art. 8.28.

See REMY GERBAY, THE FUNCTIONS OF ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS 11-18 (2016). The
ostensible function of CETA's administrative apparatus is to support the appellate tribunal,
but presumably the parties will implement the apparatus so that it serves an administrative
function with respect to both the first-instance and appellate tribunals. See Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 77, at art. 8.28.
87. See Wood, supra note 84, at 2.
88. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 77, at art. 8.27.
89. See id.
86.
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dispute resolution in which the institution, if any, serves only an
administrative role, and the decision-makers are not part of the
institution or available to resolve future disputes as they arise during
a specified term. They are instead appointed for a particular dispute
or set of disputes arising from past events. 90
The third institutional element that CETA would introduce is a
standing appellate tribunal, similar in some respects to the WTO
Appellate Body. 91 That tribunal is to engage in substantive review of
the legal and factual correctness of first-instance decisions and directly
92
modify any erroneous aspects of those decisions. By contrast, in
existing investment arbitration mechanisms, awards are reviewable
only for an assessment of the procedural legitimacy of the original
proceeding, resulting in either validation or invalidation of all or part
of the award. 93 These proceedings are also generally conducted by
95
arbitrators appointed, 94 or domestic judges charged, to assess a
particular award, not by decision-makers appointed to conduct assess96
ments of all decisions reached within an international institution.
Neither the EU nor Canada has specifically marketed these institution-enhancing elements of an investment court as improvements to
the fact-finding process, but others have over the years put forward
three basic arguments as to why institutionalism could have positive
effects on a system's handling of evidence. Because the debate over
institutionalism centers on other questions of legitimacy, these arguments are usually made without any analysis specific to fact-finding.
The first and most prevalent argument is that institutionalization
can improve fact-finding quality by increasing the independence of
the adjudicators from disputing parties. A second argument focuses on
the perceived ability of court systems, especially those with appellate
90. See id.
91. See Koorosh Ameli et al., Task Force Paper Regarding the Proposed International
Court System (ICS), EUR. FED'N INV. L. & ARB. 39-40 (Jan. 2, 2016) (draft),
https://efila.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/EFILA_TASK_FORCE_on_ICS_proposal_l-22016.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA32-9NNK].
92. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 77, at art. 8.28(2).
93. Caron, supra note 31, at 23.
94. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 52, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
95. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
art. 5, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
96. See Caron, supra note 31, at 23. CETA does not establish the number or tenure of
appellate tribunal members and leaves open the scope of the institution's administrative
functions. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 77, at art. 8.28.
Instead, the CETA Joint Committee, composed of representatives of the two parties, will
"adopt a decision" on "administrative and organizational matters regarding the functioning
of the Appellate Tribunal," including "administrative support," "procedures for the initiation
and the conduct of appeals," and "any other elements it determines to be necessary for the
effective functioning of the Appellate Tribunal." Id. at art. 8.28(7).
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review, to enhance the consistency and predictability of fact-finding.
And a third argument conceives of standing courts as institutions
capable of increasing the technical, subject-matter expertise of its
decisionmakers in the course of adjudicating disputes over time. The
remainder of this Part examines each of these arguments in turn. The
conclusion here is that an investment court is likely to have only
marginal effects on fact-finding quality, possibly negative on net, while
increasing the cost and length of dispute resolution.
The focus of the analysis is on quality, but it is important to
acknowledge upfront-and then set aside-the related issue of
efficiency in fact-finding. Regardless of whether an investment court
will improve fact-finding quality, there is no serious debate about
the negative trade-offs of any gains in quality that an investment court
might bring.9 7 All else equal, an investment court-especially a more
substantial mechanism for review of decisions-will by its own terms
introduce more process and delay finality. 98 It will also introduce,
because of the standing and institutionalized nature of the court,
overhead costs necessary to compensate adjudicators and staff when
they are idle and to operate the mechanism's additional facilities and
infrastructure. 99 All else equal, that means that disputing parties will
spend more time and money resolving their disputes through an investment court than through existing forms of investment arbitration.
It is, of course, possible to mitigate these costs-or even to streamline the process in certain respects-with time limits, fee caps, parttime staffing, or other innovations.1 00 But the same innovations
are available to mechanism designers with or without the added
institutionalism of an investment court. Even the proponents of an
investment court do not argue that the court's institutional elements
will do anything other than degrade efficiency. 101 In the end, as
97. See, e.g., Joerg Risse, A New "Investment Court System"-Reasonable Proposal
or Nonstarter?, GLOB. ARB. NEWS (Sept. 25, 2015), http://globalarbitrationnews.com/
investment-court-system-20150925/ [https://perma.cc/F3M3-9JS7].
98.

Mirjam van de Hel-Koedoot, The Proposed New Investment Court System for TTIP:

The Right Way Forward?, EUR. FED'N FOR INV. L. & ARB. BLOG (Oct. 14, 2015), http://
efilablog.org/2015/10/14/the-proposed-new-investment-court-system-for-ttip-theright-wayforward/ [https://perma.cc/CJ8Z-L3C3].
99. See INT'L BAR ASS'N ARBITRATION SUBCOMM., CONSISTENCY, EFFICIENCY AND
TRANSPARENCY IN INVFSTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 33-34 (2018), https://www.ibanet.org/

Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=a8d68c6c-120b-4a6a-afd0-4397bc22b569
[https://perma.cc/WP7J-VRDF].
100. Although the CETA Joint Committee will determine the details of the CETA investment court's procedural framework at a later date, the EU has indicated that it will seek to
clarify and reduce procedural deadlines. See, e.g., European Commission Press Release
MEMO/15/6060, Why the New EU Proposal for an Investment Court System in TTIP Is Beneficial to Both States and Investors (Nov. 12, 2015).
101. The EU has been clear that it believes rule changes-rather than institutional elements-will lead to efficiency gains. See id. ("The system has clear procedural deadlines to
ensure fast dispute settlement and to keep costs low.") (emphasis added).

2020]

INSTITUTIONALISM AND FACT-FINDING

299

discussed in Part I.A, a mechanism's designers and users will weigh
to varying degrees these efficiency trade-offs of an investment court
against any gains in quality.
A.

The Effects of Independence on
Fact-FindingQuality

The ongoing debate about the legitimacy of international dispute
settlement is, to a significant extent, a debate over the independence
of decision-makers from the parties to a dispute. It is no surprise,
then, that the most common argument made in support of furthering
institutionalism and judicialization in dispute settlement is that it
will increase the independence of decision-makers from the disputing
102
The
parties and, as a result, enhance overall decisional quality.
EU and Canada have themselves touted the increased independence
of CETA's investment court as a key selling point.1 0 3
Although the topic of independence has generated considerable
04
debate among rational design and judicial politics scholars,'1 there is
no serious question that independence from disputing parties "makes
individual judges or arbitrators more neutral and their decisions
less biased."1 05 By freeing decision-makers to decide cases based on
their own views of the facts and the law, rather than the views of the
06
disputing parties, independence generates higher quality outcomes.1
The following analysis first seeks to confirm the claim that an
investment court will enjoy a higher degree of independence by creating a framework for scoring independence on a numerical scale.
After confirming the claim of the EU and Canada that CETA is likely
to increase the independence of investment dispute resolution,
the analysis then asks whether that independence will improve factfinding. The conclusion here, in contrast to what general theories
102. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-PacificPartnershipClause Everyone Should
Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dis2
77
2 2
pute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/0 / 5/ec 05a -bdle- 11e4is a lack
there
that
(arguing
[https://perma.cc/3T7K-XYGT]
b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html
of arbitrator independence in investment arbitration).
103. See, e.g., Joint Interpretative Instrument on CETA, supra note 25, at ¶ 6.
104. This debate has been focused on whether independence makes a decision more or
less "effective." See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
105. See Guzman, supra note 29, at 209.
106. See, e.g., id. at 208-13; Benedict Kingsbury, Neo-MadisonianGlobal Constitutionalism: Thomas M. Franck's Democratic Cosmopolitan Prospectusfor ManagingDiversity and
World Orderin the Twenty-First Century, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 291, 296 (2003); Helfer
& Slaughter, supra note 29, at 901-09. Independence may also free decision-makers to pursue, to the detriment of quality, their own objectives, such as the achievement of particular
public policies, attendance to the interests of non-disputing states or interest groups, or the
enhancement of the dispute settlement system's authority and prestige. See, e.g., Lawrence
Baum, What Judges Want: Judges'Goals and JudicialBehavior, 47 POL. RES. Q. 749, 752
(1994).

300

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:279

of independence usually predict, is that independence, especially of
the type CETA will provide, is likely to have only marginal effects on
fact-finding quality, likely negative on net.
1. MeasuringIndependence in InternationalDispute Settlement
There is no precise way to measure independence, but a useful
numerical scale of relative independence developed by Eric Posner
and John Yoo confirms what the EU and Canada have been saying:
that its investment court is likely to exhibit a higher degree of
independence than today's investment arbitration mechanisms.1 0 7
In their original assessment, Posner and Yoo scored twelve dispute
settlement systems according to the number of independence-enhancing attributes that they possess, with zero representing the lowest
degree of independence. 108 An archetypal dependent tribunal-with a
score of zero-would lack these characteristics and exist only on an ad
hoc basis, with decision-makers closely controlled by disputing parties
through the power of reappointment or threats of retaliation. 09
Posner and Yoo identified five core attributes of independence,
roughly defined as: (1) the possibility that a state could be bound to a
ruling without its consent in a particular dispute; (2) the possibility
that no national of the state parties is on the panel that hears the dispute; (3) the ability of third parties to participate in the proceeding; (4)
a permanent body of judges; and (5) judicial tenure that extends beyond a given dispute.' 1 0 Others have identified additional factors, such
as (6) an adequately funded administrative apparatus"' and (7) nonrenewable terms," 2 that tend to increase a mechanism's independence,
bringing the number of potential characteristics of independence to at
least seven. There are likely many others.
A numerical score calculated in this way is an imprecise measure,
to be sure. For one, there is disagreement as to what constitutes an
independence-enhancing attribute." 3 And a score calculated using
simple addition does not attempt to weight attributes based on their
relative effects on independence, even though it is clear that some
attributes contribute to independence more than others." 4 The scale
also does not attempt to account for potentially meaningful differences
107. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 29, at 52 (measuring the relative independence of
state-to-state disputes).
108. See id.
109. Id. at 8, 27.
110. See id.
111. See Guzman, supra note 29, at 207-09.
112. See Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 38, at 259.
113. See id.; Guzman, supra note 29, at 207-09; Posner & Yoo, supra note 29, at 52.
114. See Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 38, at 258-59 (emphasizing the importance of nonrenewable terms to independence).
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across mechanisms with respect to a particular attribute, such as
differences in the length of adjudicator terms."' A nine-year term
could have more independence-enhancing effects than a four-year
term, for example, even if the term is renewable, because threats
of retaliation or the prospect of no reappointment may matter less to
an adjudicator with a lengthier job contract. Despite these obvious
shortcomings, the Posner-Yoo scale nevertheless provides a useful
framework for assessing the relative independence of international
courts and tribunals.
Using a modified version of the Posner-Yoo scale, Figure 1 below
compares the independence of the CETA investment court at both the
fact-finding and appellate stages to that of other international courts
and tribunals. This "Modified Posner-Yoo" scale examines seven
attributes of independence, including the five used in the original
Posner-Yoo scale and the two additional attributes identified by
others.
Four of the attributes are "rules-based." Whether a third-party
can participate in a dispute, for example, is an attribute that depends
on the existence of a written provision in an international agreement,
institutional framework, or an ad hoc agreement to arbitrate. That
provision, or rule, has effect with or without a standing institution.
The remaining three attributes are "institution-based" in the sense
that they are available only to mechanisms with a standing
institution of some kind. A standing body of judges, judicial terms
that extend beyond a given dispute, and an administrative apparatus
are attributes that each depend on the existence of an institution.
Because the original scale was limited to state-to-state disputes, the
Modified Posner-Yoo scale presented here makes one other change,
adding three varieties of investor-state dispute settlement-a CETAstyle mechanism, ad hoc investment arbitration, and institutional
investment arbitration. (It also adds the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
because of its relatively high dispute frequency and lengthy tenure.)
At the same time, the modified scale omits any mechanism considered
in the original that is inactive, confined to regional integration
arrangements, or devoted to claims not arising under international
economic law."'

115. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 29, at 8, 27, 52.
116. The Modified Posner-Yoo scale omits the Permanent Court of International Justice,
the pre-WTO General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs mechanism, the European Court of
Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, and the International Criminal Court. See Posner & Yoo, supranote 29, at 52.
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Figure 1: Relative Independence of Selected InternationalCourts and
Tribunals at the Fact-Finding(and Appellate)
Stages According to the Modified Posner-Yoo Scaley

According to the Modified Posner-Yoo (MPY) scale, the ICJ, ITLOS,
and the WTO are the most independent among existing mechanisms,
with scores ranging from four to five at the fact-finding stage (MPY
4-5); ad hoc state-to-state arbitration is the most dependent, with a
score of zero (MPY 0); ad hoc investment arbitration and institutional
investment arbitration are relatively dependent, with a range from
one to three (MPY 1-3); and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal occupies a

117. Asterisks indicate assumptions about CETA's features that are only tentative given
that the CETA Joint Committee had not at the time of writing made decisions on many
details of the investment court, including the term of the members of the appellate tribunal
and the nature of the administrative apparatus. The carrot symbols indicate that, while most
investment arbitration mechanisms permit disputing parties to appoint a national of the
party (in the case of a government party) or a national of the home government (in the case
of an investor), a small minority of mechanisms may prohibit the appointment of such nationals. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican
States, and Canada, art. 14.D.6, Nov. 30, 2018, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade[https://perma.cc/
agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between
2AVX-9HAD] (Selection of Arbitrators) (following the general approach and allowing disputing parties to appoint nationals, in the investor-state mechanism agreed between United
States and Mexico). Information with respect to appellate mechanisms is included in parentheticals.
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middle ground, with a score of three (MPY 3). These scores largely
coincide with the conclusions of other observers as to the independence
or dependence of these mechanisms." 8
The WTO's score requires additional explanation. Although highly
independent at the appellate stage (MPY 6), it is slightly more dependent at the panel stage (MPY 4) because, unlike the WTO Appellate
Body, panels are not standing bodies and do not have adjudicators with
terms beyond a single dispute.11 9 The lack of these two attributes in
particular may mean that the parties to a dispute exercise significant
2 0
This has precluded
control over the appointment of panelists.
consensus among observers as to the degree of the WTO's dependence
or independence.12 1 As discussed further below, this lack of theoretical
consensus bears out in the fact-finding context at least, as the
WTO engages in some hybrid fact-finding practices that defy simple
categorization along dependent or independent lines.
As compared to ad hoc investment arbitration (MPY 1-2), CETA
adds all three institutional elements that increase independence-a
standing body of judges, judicial terms that extend beyond a given
dispute, and an administrative apparatus-scoring a five at the factfinding stage (MPY 5). (CETA does not change the status quo with
2 2
respect to the rules-based elements of independence. ) This confirms
that the CETA investment court would transform what is today a

118. For example, most assessments have concluded that the ICJ is relatively independent. See, e.g., Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and
the Independence of the InternationalJudge, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 271 (2003). But see Dunoff
& Pollack, supra note 38, at 259 (concluding that the ICJ is relatively dependent, primarily
due to renewable terms staggered so that appointments occur every three years, but acknowledging that "many respected observers concluding that judicial independence at the
ICJ is high"). Investment arbitration in its current forms is generally considered relatively
dependent. See Born, supra note 29, at 873.
119. The WTO is widely cited as relatively independent overall. Dunoff & Pollack, supra
note 38, at 262 ("[M]ost assessments have found that the [WTO] dispute system is highly
independent from the litigants and member states."). But the WTO Appellate Body's relatively short terms and the ability of states to associate Appellate Body members with certain
outcomes may mean that it is less independent in practice. See id. at 271.
120. See generally Ryan Brutger & Julia C. Morse, Balancing Law and Politics: Judicial
Incentives in WTO Dispute Settlement, 10 REV. INT'L ORGS. 179 (2015); see also Born, supra
note 29, at 872-73 (classifying WTO panels as relatively dependent because parties exercise
significant control over panel appointments). But see Joost Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law Without the Rule of Lawyers: Why Investment ArbitratorsAre from Mars, Trade Adjudicatorsfrom

Venus, 109 AM. J. INT'L L. 761, 784-87 (2015) (arguing that WTO panels "are more 'neutrally'
appointed" than ICSID arbitrators).
121. See Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 38, at 262, 271.
122. Existing investment arbitration mechanisms vary with respect to the ability of third
parties to participate in proceedings. CETA, meanwhile, provides explicitly for a form of
third-party participation because it contemplates participation of the non-disputing treaty
party (i.e., the home government of the investor) through written and oral submissions "regarding the interpretation of the agreement." See Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement, supra note 77, at art. 8.38.
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relatively dependent form of dispute settlement into one that is at
the high-end of the independence scale, in line with and possibly
even surpassing the high degree of independence associated with the

ICJ, ITLOS, and the WTO.
2.

Measuring the Effects of Independence on Fact-FindingQuality

If an investment court will exhibit higher degrees of independence
from disputing parties, what does that mean for the quality of factfinding in investment disputes? Rote application of the general
consensus on independence would lead to a conclusion that greater independence yields higher quality fact-finding. But, such a conclusion
would ignore the specific and complicating characteristics of fact-

finding.
A theory of independence and fact-finding must take into account a
distinction between the two most basic components of the fact-finding
process." The first component involves the production and testing
of evidence. 1 4 Evidence production and testing leads to the creation
of a factual record, based on submissions of documentary evidence,
witness testimony, and other sources. 12 1 As the evidence is produced,
the parties and the decision-maker both begin to test the evidence for
reliability through information exchanges, cross-examination, written
questions, and other forms of adversarial or adjudicatory prodding. 126
The second component of fact-finding involves the evaluation of
evidence. 12" The outcome of this fact-finding component is a set of
factual determinations that are based on the evidence making up the
factual record, ideally as weighted according to the relative reliability
of sources.12
With respect to the second component, evidence evaluation, applying general theories of independence to fact-finding suggests that an
investment court will engage in higher quality evaluations of evidence
because decision-makers will reduce "reliance on the parties" at the
evaluation stage,129 allow them to "accept views beyond those of the
123. This is of course just one of many ways to conceptualize the fact-finding process.
Especially in common law jurisdictions, there is an argument, for example, that "admissibility" is distinct from production, testing, and evaluation. See SANDIFER, supra note 28, at 176-

96.
124. See id. at 1-29 (distinguishing between the evaluation and production components
of fact-finding).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. These two components of fact-finding are of course not temporally exclusive.
Decision-makers as a practical matter do not wait to evaluate evidence until the evidentiary
record is complete.
129. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 29, at 208-09 n.114.
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litigants,"" and focus the decision-maker on the facts of the case
rather than the preferred outcomes of the disputing parties and the
13
potential implications of those preferences on the decision-maker. 1
There is no reason to doubt that these specific applications of general
theory hold and that independence will, all else equal, improve the
quality of the evaluation component of fact-finding.
With respect to the first component, evidence production, general
theory predicts that independence from the disputing parties means
independence from their presentations of evidence. Independent
decision-makers are thus more likely to "play an active role in the
collection of factual evidence,"1 3 2 conduct evidence gathering "without
reliance on the parties,"'1 3 3 and "discover the truth independently of
34
Enhancing
the information and evidence brought by the parties."1
independence, in other words, may mean that decision-makers become
more self-reliant. 13 5
The natural result of self-reliance is a decrease in opportunities
for meaningful production and testing of party-presented evidence
and meaningful party participation in the production and testing of
adjudicated-generated evidence. Theory predicts, 3 6 and experience
with actual courts and tribunals confirms, 137 that self-reliant decisionmakers are less likely to emphasize the production and testing of
party-presented evidence, whether in written or oral form. They are
instead more likely to do their own research, perform their own review
of complex documentary evidence, and rely on informal input from
138
administrative staff or other non-party sources.

By contrast, in relatively dependent systems, such as existing forms
of investment arbitration (MPY 0-2), it is the parties who are primarily
responsible for supplying evidence. 139 The system trusts the adversarial process-including the ability of counsel to cross-examine experts
130.
131.

See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 165-66.
See Guzman, supra note 29, at 209 ("The connection between independence and

information is clear: greater independence makes individual judges or arbitrators more neu-

tral and their decisions less biased. Put another way, as tribunals become more dependent,
it is more likely that a ruling is the product of political forces rather than a judgment about
the relevant legal rules and their application to the facts.").
132.

WHITE, supra note 64, at 4.

133. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 29, at 208-09 n.114.
134. WHITE, supra note 64, at 4.
135. See id. at 4-5; see also ALTER, supra note 38, at 186 (noting that the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal "became increasingly legalized and judges increasingly independent" over
time).
136. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 29, at 208-09 n.114.
137. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 64, at 4-5.
138. See infra notes 146-166 and accompanying text.
139.

See CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES

CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 199-200, 202 (1998); Born, supra note 29, at 874-75.
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of the other party-as the primary means to explore the reliability
of evidence.' 4 ' Theories of independence suggest that this is because
dependent decision-makers are reluctant to appear uninterested in
the presentations of the disputing parties.1 4 1 In other words, they are
less self-reliant in fact-finding than their independent counterparts.
The relative independence or dependence of a decision-maker,
then, coincides with a tendency toward or away from self-reliance
in the production and testing of evidence. And it is this relationship
between independence and self-reliance that leads relatively independent decision-makers astray. The tendency of self-reliance to
diminish opportunities for the disputing parties to produce and test
evidence and, ultimately, to create a usable and reliable factual
record, has negative effects on quality. 4 2 The parties are, after all, the
best sources of evidence because they are the ones that were involved
in the situation that gave rise to the dispute.' The pull of party
self-interest, at the same time, facilitates the exchange and testing
of information. 4 4 For those reasons, most evidentiary rules attempt

140.
141.

See Swinehart, supra note 48, at 303-04.
See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 29, at 208-09 n.114.

142.

See MICHELLE T. GRANDO, EVIDENCE, PROOF, AND FACT-FINDING IN WTO DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT 307-08 (2009). Self-reliance in the production of evidence may improve quality
in limited circumstances such as when the parties are unable or unwilling to produce their
own evidence. See SANDIFER, supra note 28, at 4 & n.7. The tribunal in the South China Sea
Arbitration, for example, engaged in substantial judicial fact-finding, where China had refused to participate in the proceedings, in fulfilling its duty under Annex VI of the United
Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea to "satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction
over the dispute but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law" where a party is
absent from the dispute. See Philippines v. China, PCA Case Repository 2013-19, ¶¶ 12942 (2016). The tribunal supplemented the factual submissions of the Philippines by appointing a number of experts and independently obtaining historic survey records, but it provided
opportunities for the Philippines (and China if it wished) to participate in the production
of that evidence and to comment on it. See Harry Ormsby, Judicial Fact-Findingand
the South China Sea Arbitration, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Sept. 6, 2016) http://
arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/09/06/judicial-fact-finding-and-the-southchina-sea-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/T4BW-FA2X].
143. See GRANDO, supra note 142, at 15.
144. See id.; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 3, at 304 & n.122 (highlighting the importance of an adversarial fact-finding process in all domestic legal systems and noting that
in both common law and civil law jurisdictions judges are "highly dependent on the parties
for presentation of the evidence"); see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO,
AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION 86 (1993).
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to guarantee,"' and general principles of international law call for,'
a central role for the disputing parties in the production and testing
of evidence.
It is no surprise, then, that the limited praise that international law
has garnered in evidentiary production and testing has been directed
toward dependent mechanisms.' 4 7 The focus of dependent fact-finders
on the adversarial process and the fact presentations of the parties
1 48
is widely thought to produce the type of "substantial fact-finding"
and comprehensive evidentiary records that provide the minimum
necessary basis to tackle the complex questions presented in international disputes.1 49
Similarly, it is no surprise that the widespread criticisms of evidentiary production and testing in international law have focused on
relatively independent mechanisms.1 " Observers and even members
of the ICJ (MPY 4-5) have repeatedly noted the Court's reluctance
to engage with party-produced expert evidence of any sort' or to
otherwise engage with complex evidence in a manner that affords
the disputing parties an opportunity to test any evidence that is
produced. 52 The ICJ is known instead for a tendency to rely on documentary evidence rather than oral testimony"' and for "attach[ing]

145.

See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 82, at arts. 63,

65-66; U.N. COMM. ON INT'L TRADE LAW, supra note 82, at art. 27; INT'L CTR. FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 71, at 115-16; PERMANENT COURT OF
ARBITRATION, supra note 82, at 11-12.
146. See CHARLES T. KOTUBY JR. & LUKE A. SABOTA, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS: PRINCIPLES AND NORMS APPLICABLE IN TRANSNATIONAL

DISPUTES 179 (2017) ("[D]ue process is denied when the decision is based upon evidence and
argumentation that a party has been unable to address."); SANDIFER, supra note 28, at 105,
108, 113 ("It is an established principle of modern judicial procedure that judgments can only
be based upon allegations fully proved by competent evidence produced before the court or
admitted by the parties."); WHITE, supra note 64, at 11, 14.
147. See Born, supra note 29, at 873-76.
148. See id.; see also Rosalyn Higgins, The Desirability of Third-Party Adjudication:
Conventional Wisdom or Continuing Truth, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: LAW IN

MOVEMENT 37, 42-46 (James E.S. Fawcett & Rosalyn Higgins eds., 1974).
149. See Shari Seidman Diamond, PsychologicalAspects of DisputeResolution: Issues for
International Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 327, 340-41 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2003).

IMPORTANT

150. As Jose Alvarez has argued, "[i]nternational courts, including the European ones
that presumably the EU has in mind as models, have not always issued the well-reasoned
decisions that rule of law proponents want nor engaged in the credible fact-finding that is
crucial to many [investor-state dispute settlement] disputes." Alvarez, supra note 27.

151. See, e.g., Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep.
18, 108, $ 3-13 (Apr. 20) (Al-Khasawneh, J. & Simma, J., dissenting).
152. See Riddell, supra note 78, at 857 (noting this phenomenon with respect to Courtappointed experts).
153. See John R. Crook, Fact-Findingin the Fog: Determining the Facts of Upheaval and
Wars in Inter-State Disputes, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 313, 315-20

(Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009).
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considerable probative value to reports compiled and communicated
by [United Nations] agencies,"154 including the World Health Organization and other international organizations.1 " The ICJ (MPY 4-5) is
also the most well-known example of an institution whose adjudicators
rely on informal input from third-parties who are not formally
appointed as expert witnesses, 156 while ITLOS (MPY 5) also appears
to rely on this type of "unseen expert.""'
In addition, the decision-makers at the ICJ, ITLOS, and the WTO
(MPY 4-6) appear to engage in their own factual research, what is
sometimes referred to as "judicial fact-finding."" The dangers of
judicial fact-finding-or more aptly, "judicial self-study"-are clear.
Judicial self-study increases the frequency and effects of errors in
evidence production and testing1 59 because lawyers are not equipped
by virtue of their legal training to assess and weigh complex scientific,
economic, or other technical evidence.16 0 It also diminishes or prevents
any opportunity for the parties to subject expert evidence to critical
and transparent assessment, raising a concern that the decision-

154.

ANNA RIDDELL & BRENDAN PLANT, EVIDENCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

OF JUSTICE 237 (2009).
155. See, e.g., Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 66, ¶¶ 23-24 (July 8). This could present a dynamic akin
to the special standing observed in the U.S. Supreme Court for the solicitor general's office
and other government actors. See generally Nancy Morawetz, Convenient Facts: Nken v.
Holder, the Solicitor General, and the Presentationof Internal Government Facts, 88 N.Y.U.

&

L. REV. 1600, 1606-07 (2013).
156. See Girgio Gaja, Assessing Expert Evidence in the ICJ, 15 L. & PRAC. INT'L CTS.
TRIBUNALS 409, 413 (2016) ("The Court has often attempted to acquire scientific or technical
knowledge by informally consulting experts."); Arg. v. Uru., 2010 I.C.J. at 108, ¶ 14; but see
SANDIFER, supra note 28, at 162-63 (noting in 1975 that the Court's registrar participated
in the production of evidence only "to a very limited extent").
157. See generally Guillaume Y.J. Gros, Unseen Experts as Unseen Actors: Ghosts in
International Adjudication, in UNSEEN ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (Freya
Baetans ed., 2019).
158. The conclusion that self-reliant adjudicators in the international context are more
likely to engage in their own fact-finding is consistent with examinations of U.S. appellate
courts. A review of fact-finding in the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, examined instances
in which individual justices did their own research using textbooks and other documents,
noting certain members of the court had "regularly" conducted their own review of studies
and other evidence. See Ryan Gabrielson, It's a Fact: Supreme Court Errors Aren't Hard to
Find, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 17, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/supremecourt-errors-are-not-hard-to-find [https://perma.cc/W6KG-VQCQ]; see also Linda Greenhouse, How Judges Know What They Know, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/29/opinion/supreme-court-judges-decisions.html

[https://perma.cc/5GZ2-

JPYD] (describing concerns with fact-finding attempts of U.S. appellate judges).
159. See Gabrielson, supra note 158 (arguing that, in Maryland v King, 569 U.S. 435
(2013), Justice Anthony Kennedy "inaccurately defin[ed] scientific terms" and "overstated
the reliability of DNA analysis" after his own review of a textbook and that, in Shelby County
v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), Chief Justice John Roberts included a table of inaccurate
voting registration data in his majority opinion).
160. Arg. v. Uru., 2010 I.C.J. at 108, ¶ 4.
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maker has relied on "intuition or supposition." 161 And, as with other
self-reliant practices, judicial self-study seems in conflict with general
principles of international law, namely that "courts and tribunals
may take judicial notice of facts" only if they "are of common knowledge
or public notoriety." 16 2
Experience also suggests that relative independence coupled with a
high degree of institutionalization may encourage "institutional factfinding"-reliance on specialized input from an institution's own
in-house team of administrative or research staff. This is a particularly
negative consequence of self-reliance. The three most independent
existing mechanisms examined here, the ICJ, ITLOS, and the WTO,
are all known for engaging in this type of fact-finding.1 63 At the WTO,
for example, the Secretariat's Economic Research and Statistics
64
Division routinely provides support to panels on economic questions.1
Decision-makers who consult with institutional staff generally do
not make that work available to the parties or the public and do not
disclose in their decisions if or how they relied on that work, affording
no opportunity for the parties to participate in the selection of
"experts," to challenge their conclusions, or to introduce rebuttal
evidence. 16
Taking stock of these experiences as a whole, they appear to
confirm what theory would predict.1 66 Rational design and judicial
161.

See Franck et al., supra note 30, at 1171.

162. See KOTUBY & SABOTA, supra note 146, at 190-91; see also BIN CHENG, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF LAw AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 303 (George W.

Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 1953) ("Proof may thus be dispensed with as regards
facts which are of common knowledge or public notoriety or which, in the circumstances of
the case, are self-evident."). Bin Cheng noted that the site visits conducted in many cases,
including those involving border disputes, "present] considerable affinity with judicial notice." See id. at 304.
163. See generally Gros, supra note 157; see also Arg. v. Uru., 2010 I.C.J. at 108, ¶ 4.
164. See Chad P. Bown, The WTO Secretariat and the Role of Economics in DSU
Panels and Arbitrations 36 (Aug. 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.coml
abstract=1274732 [https://perma.cc/5T9U-RRBD] ("The WTO's DSU adjudication process inherently involves bringing about changes to Member nation's economic policies. Therefore,
panellist [sic] and arbitrator's decisions and rulings should be informed by the best available
economic analysis and support that the Secretariat can provide.").
165. See Gros, supra note 157; Gaja, supranote 156, at 413.
166. As noted above, application of the self-reliance theory predicts that WTO panels
would exhibit certain hybrid fact-finding characteristics that might defy their relatively high
Modified Posner-Yoo score of four. See, e.g., Born, supra note 29, at 874-75 (arguing that
WTO panels engage in more substantial fact-finding based on party-presented evidence than
"first-generation" tribunals like the ICJ). For instance, despite a lack of procedural rules
providing for the examination of witnesses at panel hearings, parties to a WTO dispute (and
third-party participants) often present fact testimony and specialized evidence through delegation members, including lawyers, economists, and scientists. See Swinehart, supra note

48, at 298-99. This means that they essentially serve as fact and expert witnesses. See Joost
Pauwelyn, Expert Advice in WTO Dispute Settlement, in TRADE AND HUMAN HEALTH AND
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politics theories suggest that independence should lead to higher
quality evaluations of evidence, and there is no reason to doubt that
conclusion here. But theory, upon closer inspection, also predicts that
independence may depress fact-finding quality in a number of ways,
because it leads to self-reliant practices in the production and testing
of evidence that are less transparent, robust, and intellectually sound.
A survey of practices at a range of courts and tribunals confirms these
predictions, with the added complication that highly institutionalized
mechanisms may introduce especially unsound practices.
It is not enough to have "quality" tendencies in the evaluation
of evidence. Even the most unbiased and qualified decision-maker
cannot come to accurate factual determinations on the basis of an
incomplete or faulty evidentiary record. The downsides of self-reliance
may explain why even highly independent decision-makers struggle
to engage in quality fact-finding as well as why users of dispute
settlement remain dissatisfied with fact-finding practices across
nearly every mechanism.
None of this is to say that dependence resolves concerns about
fact-finding quality. There is no doubt that independence generally
improves quality, and it is clear that relatively dependent decisionmakers today continue to share with their more independent counterparts an inability to handle factual complexity.1 67 What this analysis
shows is that independence is, at best, an incomplete solution to
concerns about fact-finding quality. It is also possibly a source of
unintended-and negative-consequences. Reforming fact-finding
practices is not so simple, then, as enhancing the institutional
character of a fact-finder in an effort to increase its independence.
This Article will return in Part III to the question of alternative
reforms, identifying non-institutional influences that can improve
fact-finding.
B.

The Effects of an Investment Court on Consistency and
Predictabilityin Fact-Finding

A second possible benefit of enhancing the role of institutions and
institutional actors in fact-finding is that it will-primarily through
the introduction of substantive appellate review-promote consistency
and predictability.1 68 This is a corollary to broader arguments made in
support of the increased institutionalization of investment courts. The
EU and Canada intend for CETA's appellate tribunal, for example, to
SAFETY 235, 251-52 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2006). Disputing parties, at the same time, remain unable to cross-examine these delegation members. See id. at
251.
167. See supra Part I.B.
168. See, e.g., Riddell, supra note 78, at 849-50.
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correct legal errors and instill greater consistency in case law. 169 But
fact-finding is distinct from legal interpretation in several ways that
likely inhibit any positive effects that institutionalism may have on
consistency and predictability in fact-finding.
1.

Consistency and Predictabilityin Legal Interpretation

To understand how investment court elements might affect the
consistency and predictability of fact-finding, it is important to first
review how theories of consistency apply to legal interpretation.
Consistency and predictability in legal interpretation are a function
of three interdependent elements: (1) the degree to which rules are
written into legal texts; (2) the capacity of a mechanism to interpret
those rules in a manner that future decision-makers will follow; and
(3) the availability and scope of an appellate review mechanism that
can reconcile competing interpretations. The efficacy of the second
element in achieving consistency and predictability in legal interpretation depends on the first element, while the third element depends
on both of the first two elements. A simple stack model, as shown in
Figure 2 below, illustrates this hierarchy of dependent relationships." 0
SUBSTANTIVE

/ DE NOVO REVIEW

DECISIONAL RULE CREATION
SPECIFIC WRITTEN RULES
Figure 2: Model of Consistency and Predictabilityin
Legal Interpretation

169. Joint Interpretative Instrument on CETA, supra note 25, at ¶ 6(g). Other proposals
for appellate review in investment arbitration also center on objectives related to consistency
and predictability of legal interpretation. See, e.g., Freya Baetans, Keeping the Status Quo
or Embarking on a New Course? Setting Aside, Refusal of Enforcement, Annulment, and
Appeal, in REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 103, 114-15

(Andreas Kulick ed., 2017); Irene J. Ten Cate, InternationalArbitration and the Ends of
Appellate Review, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1109, 1111-12 (2012) ("In investment
arbitration, ... proposals call for the creation of a permanent appeals facility that articulates
coherent interpretations of substantive terms in investment treaties."); Gantz, supra note 1,

at 42-45. This Article does not consider whether existing investment arbitration does in fact
lack consistency or predictability in legal interpretation. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Implications
for the Futureof InternationalInvestment Law, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 29, 33 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008) ("Creating a super-tribunal of investment judges may be a solution in search of a problem-if the lack of consistent results

proves not as serious in reality as in prediction.").
170. The stack concept originated in the context of the internet, which is composed of
various protocols that build on one another so that hardware can communicate in ways that

are intuitive to humans. See Henrik Frystyk, The Internet Protocol Stack, W3 (July 1994),
https://www.w3.org/People/Frystyk/thesis/Tcplp.html [https://perma.cc/A524-NH24].
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Specific Written Rules-The first element of this stack modelthe existence of specific written rules-is a feature of all international
dispute settlement mechanisms. Each mechanism facilitates the
resolution of disputes that arise out of one or more legal texts with
substantive legal obligations.1 7 1 The legal text serves as a fixed
reference point for decision-makers who must justify their interpretations of the plain text, ensuring some degree of consistency and
predictability.17 2 The more specific the legal text, the more difficult it
becomes to justify deviations from prior interpretations.1 7 3
For the purposes of comparing legal interpretation and fact-finding,
it is important to note that the substantive legal provisions in international agreements are specific only in a relative sense. Despite a trend
toward greater specificity in the drafting of international agreements,
substantive legal rules remain quite general so that their content is
often unclear from the face of the agreement.17 4 But they are much
more specific than the procedural and evidentiary aspects of international law, a key distinction examined further below.
Decisional Rule Creation-The second element of consistency
and predictability, unlike the first, does not exist in all mechanisms.
It is true that all courts and tribunals, domestic and international,
serve at least one of two essential dispute resolution functions: the
job of determining whether a party to a particular dispute has violated
a legal rule.1 7 5 But not all mechanisms serve a second function of
decisional rule creation: the formation of rules in the course of resolving one dispute that indicate the likely outcome of similar disputes in
the future.1 7 6 It is this second dispute resolution function that improves
the consistency and predictability that is achievable with written legal
rules alone.1 77

Most domestic legal systems employ some means of rule creation.
Common law jurisdictions necessarily depend on rule creation in the
form of precedent, which binds judges to rules set out in previous

171.
172.
173.
straints
174.

See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 29, at 945-46.
See id.
See id. at 945 (arguing that "[c]learly defined substantive rules impose real conon tribunals and the parties that wish to use them").
See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence
Constante, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE
265, 271 (Colin Picker et al. eds., 2008).
175. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 236 (1979).
176. See id.
177. See Park, supra note 45, at 49 n.122 ("Within a single jurisdiction, a measure of
uniformity can be imposed from the top down so that one case furnishes authority for decisions in similar fact patterns with similar questions of law."); see also Landes & Posner,
supra note 175, at 236 (describing the operation of precedent in a domestic court context).
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decisions.1 78 Civil law systems do not as a general matter depend on
precedent, but nonetheless contain a degree of rule creation because
they generally attribute precedential authority to a line of consistent
precedents that has crystalized over time. 179
By their design, international law mechanisms do not formally
participate in rule creation because their decisional law is not
considered precedential,18 0 although decision-makers may of course
in appropriate circumstances look to prior decisional law as
persuasive authority, and this may promote interpretive consistency
to some degree. 181 Achieving the maximum possible consistency
and predictability in legal interpretation would require that a mechanism deviate from this default rule and establish a formal system
of precedential authority." Nothing in the CETA text, however,
indicates that the EU and Canada intend to establish such a framework, leaving the mechanism without the formal ability to impose
consistency and predictability in legal interpretation through

precedent. 183
Of course it is widely understood that, even without a formal system
of precedent, "soft" rule creation can take hold, as observed in many
current mechanisms,1 84 through informal adherence to previously
settled doctrine.1 8 1 The issue of soft rule creation in international law
is a matter of considerable controversy, and there is a range of possible
explanations for its pervasiveness in international law despite a lack
of formal underpinning.1 88 But given that some form of rule creation
178. Landes & Posner, supra note 175, at 236.
179. See generally Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, JudicialPrecedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis, 26 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 519 (2006).
180. See Park, supranote 45, at 49.
181. See Patrick Juillard, Variation in the Substantive Provisions and Interpretation
of International Investment Agreements, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 93 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008).

182. See Bjorklund, supra note 174, at 271 ("In systems of government using stare decisis, there are formal rules or understandings about which decisions are binding and which
are merely persuasive.").

183. The CETA text instead provides only that tribunals must interpret the agreement
"in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties." Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 77, at art. 8.31(1).
184. See Harlan Grant Cohen, Lawyers and Precedent, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1025,
1027-28 (2013) (noting precedent's "apparent authority" in international investment arbitration, international trade, international criminal law, and international human rights).
Some view the WTO Appellate Body, for example, as exercising its interpretive function, see
Appellate Body Report, UnderstandingOn Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, art. 3.2, WTO Doc. WT/DS356/AB/R, in a manner that leads panels to follow
Appellate Body reports as precedent following some senses. See Stephen S. Kho et al., The
EU TTIP Investment Court Proposal and the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Comparing
Apples and Oranges?, 32 ICSID REV. 326, 330 (2017).
185. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 84, at 10; Juillard, supra note 181, at 101.
186. See Bjorklund, supra note 174, at 274-80.
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is necessary to achieve the objective of increasing consistency and
predictability in legal interpretation, it is reasonable to conclude that
the EU and Canada silently intend for CETA's dispute settlement
system to adhere to some form of rule creation-even if only "soft."
Substantive and De Novo Appellate Review-The third element of
the stack model-substantive and de novo appellate review-adds to
the ability of a mechanism to achieve consistency and predictability
beyond what is possible with the first two elements. 187
Existing practices of extraordinary review or annulment in investment arbitration lack this design element because they perform only
limited error-correction functions. Those practices allow only for an
assessment of the procedural legitimacy of the original proceeding
and binary validation or invalidation. 188 And they create no formal
hierarchy that allows the reviewer to bind future first-instance
decision-makers. 189 The ICSID annulment process, typical of other
review mechanisms in investment arbitration today, 190 provides
for annulment in an enumerated list of circumstances, including
where "there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure" or where "the award has failed to state the reasons on
which it is based." 191
CETA will deviate from this status quo and establish a hierarchical
system of substantive and de novo review. With respect to legal
interpretation, the CETA appellate tribunal will have the authority to
"uphold, modify[,] or reverse" the first-instance award based on "errors
in the application or interpretation of applicable law." 192 This vests
the appellate tribunal with substantive and de novo review authority,
enabling it to review and modify decisions on legal questions without
deference to the reasoning of the first-instance decision-maker.
The belief motivating this change is that this broader scope of
authority, as compared to existing review, procedures enhances the
reviewer's ability to modify the legal reasoning of first-instance
decisions and to standardize underlying legal rules. 193 It is true that

187. See Caron, supranote 31, at 23.
188. See id.
189. See Bjorklund, supranote 174, at 271.
190. See Caron, supra note 31, at 34 ("The ICSID annulment process, like the prototypical annulment process, provides a quite limited remedy.").
191. INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, supra note 71, at 124.
192. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supranote 77, at art. 8.28(2).
193. See generally id. The standing nature of an appellate body may have other, ancillary
effects on rule creation. One, a standing body may show more deference to its own decisional
law than to decisions from other bodies. See Christoph Schreuer, PreliminaryRulings in
Investment Arbitration, in APPEALS MEcHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES
209 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008); Wood, supra note 84, at 9. And two, a standing body may
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CETA will establish a clear hierarchy between the appellate tribunal
and the first-instance tribunal and allow the appellate tribunal to
94
correct legal errors without deference to the first-instance tribunals.1
But as the stack model shows, the ability of appellate review to
reconcile competing legal interpretations of first-instance tribunals
depends on an ability to impose at least some form of precedent, even
if only "soft."
2.

Consistency and Predictabilityin Fact-Finding

Whether or not an investment court will promote consistency and
predictability in legal interpretation according to this three-element
stack model, the same analysis cannot be transposed neatly to the factfinding context. Instead, as reflected in Figure 3, the corresponding
stack model for fact-finding has none of the same characteristics:
(1) fact-finders enjoy broad authority under general written guidelines
(and are not subject to the constraints of specific written rules); (2)
the production, testing, and evaluation of evidence are subject to
flexible decisional norms that are intended to adapt with the demands
of individual disputes (and are not subject to precedent or soft rule
creation); and (3) first-instance decisions on factual questions are
subject at most to narrow substantive review, typically where there
has been a clear error (and are not subject to de novo review).
CLEAR ERROR REVIEW
FLEXIBLE NORMS

rriclrzG-WRITEN

ULES

BROAD AND GENERAL GUIDELINES
Figure 3: Model of Consistency and
Predictabilityin Fact-Finding

Broad and General Guidelines-In contrast to the relative
specificity of substantive legal rules, international agreements and
institutional frameworks typically lack prescriptive or otherwise
detailed evidentiary rules. As outlined in Part I.B, decision-makers
instead engage in fact-finding subject only to modest constraints in
the form of broad and general written guidelines. This suggests
that the drafters did not intend to require decision-makers within
a system to use common fact-finding approaches. The general lack
have increased incentives, beyond the usual duty to state the reasons for a decision, to produce rules rather than narrowly resolving the dispute at hand. See Landes & Posner, supra
note 175, at 239.
194. See Bjorklund, supra note 174, at 271.
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of detailed and binding rules instead affords decision-makers
flexibility and limits the constraining influence of written text.1 9
As noted previously, CETA does not appear in any way to depart from
this prevailing practice.1 96
Flexible Norms-Precedent, and even soft rule creation, also does
not apply to evidentiary processes to the same degree. Decisionmakers in international disputes eschew adherence to standardized
evidentiary processes in favor of adaptive approaches that can respond
to the specific circumstances of a dispute and that seek to strike a
balance between efficiency and accuracy that is optimal based on
those circumstances. 197 These allowances for adaptation may reflect
a well-developed consensus within an institution or otherwise among
adjudicators to avoid a highly prescriptive approach to fact-finding,
consistent with the drafting intent of system designers. There is no
sense, after all, in prescribing in advance general rules that would,
say, limit each party to two fact witnesses, no matter the complexity
of the dispute.
Fact-finders do create their own decisional norms, however, and
those norms may give participants in a system a general sense of
what to expect in future disputes.1 98 But because the norms are general
and informal, they are easier to change from dispute to dispute, more
susceptible to differences in views among decision-makers, and more
likely to lead to processes for the production, testing, and evaluation
of evidence that participants are unable to predict in any meaningful
sense.1 99
ClearErrorReview-Lastly, there is also a diminished opportunity
for appellate review to increase the consistency and predictability
of fact-finding practices. The CETA appellate tribunal will be able
to consider allegedly "manifest errors" in the fact-finding of a firstinstance tribunal, affording a significant degree of deference that

195. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 29, at 945-46 ("Precision in drafting commitments
is perhaps the most obvious formal control mechanism that states can exercise ex ante.").
196. See supra Part LB.
197. See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 167, n.48 (referring to "the 'common rules of international procedure' on which some international courts and tribunals rely").
198. These norms may take shape faster and apply more pervasively in circumstanceslike CETA's first-instance tribunal-that limit the number of fact-finders who are eligible to
decide a given set of cases. Recall that the CETA first-instance tribunal will consist of fifteen
members, serving for terms, and appointed to three-person divisions to hear each dispute. If
the dispute frequency is high enough, and the members all share the same preferences on
fact-finding processes, limiting the universe of decision-makers to fifteen may tend to increase consistency and predictability. But this depends ultimately on the-seemingly unlikely-possibility that the EU and Canada can identify and appoint fifteen decision-makers
who share the same strong fact-finding preferences and a willingness to apply those preferences uniformly in every dispute.
199. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 29, at 945-46.
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is not required with respect to legal questions.20 0 The restricted
character of that review indicates that the EU and Canada, like the
architects of the WTO and domestic appellate mechanisms, do not
believe that those mechanisms are better placed to engage in factfinding than triers of fact.2 01
Even those who see the value of substantive appellate review in
investment arbitration are skeptical that it has the potential to
improve factual accuracy 202 and stop short of suggesting that
appellate mechanisms should have any substantial opportunity to
second-guess findings of fact. 2 03 This acknowledges the core differences
in the presentation and evaluation of legal questions and fact
questions. When it comes to legal questions, arbitrators and judges
are ultimately responsible for saying what the law is, irrespective
of the parties' citations to legal rules and principles (a concept known
as jura novit curia).2 04 In a hierarchical decision-making environment,
an appellate decision-maker plays this central role in legal interpretation with the benefit of a process that has distilled legal issues over
time. 2 05 Appellate decisionmakers enjoy the benefit of first-instance
decisions that have made an initial attempt to analyze the parties'
206
The
arguments and to identify and apply relevant legal rules.
they
as
on
appeal,
submissions
their
focus
helpfully
also
may
parties
respond to opposing arguments and reactions of the first-instance
adjudicator. 207
For fact questions, however, an appellate mechanism's ability to
assess many sources of evidence, including witness testimony and
other evidence presented at hearings, is diminished because it is
further from those sources than the first-instance tribunal. Appellate
mechanisms are not, for example, able to assess the credibility of
200. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, supra note 77, at art. 8.28(2).
201. Factual questions are not within the jurisdiction of the WTO Appellate Body, although the Appellate Body considers that "[w]hether or not a panel has made an objective
assessment of the facts before it, . .. is also a legal question which, if properly raised on
appeal, would fall within the scope of appellate review." Appellate Body Report, European
Communities-MeasuresConcerningMeat and Meat Products(Hormones), ¶ 132, WTO Doc.
WT/DS26/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 1998).
202. See, e.g., Caron, supra note 31, at 54 ("[T]here is little reason to believe that the
review panel's decision would be more accurate.").

203.

R. Doak Bishop, The Case for an Appellate Panel and its Scope of Review, in

INVESTMENT TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES VOLUME 1, at 20 (Federico Ortino et al. eds.,

2006).
204. Laurent Levy, Jura Novit Curia? The Arbitrator's Discretion in the Application
of the Governing Law, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 20, 2009), http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2009/03/20/jura-novit-curia-the-arbitrators-discretion-in-the-

application-of-the-governing-law/ [https://perma.ccTK88-LRGC].
205. See Ten Cate, supra note 169, at 1146.
206. See id.
207. See id.
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oral testimony in the same fashion or direct questions in real-time
to witnesses, unless they repeat the entire fact-finding process.2 08
Most dispute settlement mechanisms, including in domestic
systems, do not allow appellate reviewers to duplicate the factfinding function of first-instance adjudicators, as there is no reason
to think that complete repetition of the fact-finding process by
different people will produce better results the second time over. 209
The WTO Appellate Body, for example, cannot conduct its own factfinding, although it may be able to opine on the propriety of factfinding procedures in the course of identifying serious errors of fact.2 1 0
This limited remit with respect to factual questions means that
the Appellate Body has relatively few opportunities to opine on appropriate evidentiary procedures or to demonstrate proper application
of those procedures, because it cannot resolve outstanding factual
questions or conduct additional evidence gathering. 21' These constraints on an appellate mechanism's capacity to impose evidencetaking norms or rules on first-instance tribunals in any given case 212
will limit the cumulative effect of an investment court on the
consistency and predictability of fact-finding.
Of course, the line between fact and law is often blurry, such as
with commonly encountered questions about whether governmental
action is sufficiently tailored to achieving a public policy objective, 213
and appellate review of those questions may incorporate analysis of
the underlying facts and result in critiques of the evidence-taking
methods of the first-instance tribunal. But, in the end, those questions
primarily generate interpretations of substantive legal provisions and
will only incidentally create evidence-taking norms or rules. At most,
then, an appellate tribunal's focus on correcting legal errors in specific

208.
209.

See id.
See Bart Legum, Options to Establish an Appellate Mechanism, in APPELLATE
MECHANISMS IN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 231, 237 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008) ("[A] certain
level of inconsistency is inevitable in any system of administration of justice. Reasonable
judges and juries can reasonably reach different results based on the same facts. And advocacy-how a case is argued and presented-really does make a difference."); Jan Paulsson,
Avoiding

Unintended

Consequences,

in

APPEALS

MECHANISM

IN

INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT DISPUTES 241, 247 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008) ("[S]uch things [like incongruent
findings of fact] happen when a story is told in different ways on different occasions to different people.").
210. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 184, art. 17.6 ("An appeal shall be limited to
issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.");
see also ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
283 (noting that the WTO Appellate Body "reviews issues of law de novo but defers heavily
to panels on findings of fact").
211. See POSNER & SYKES, supra note 210, at 283.
212. See Kho et al., supra note 184, at 344.
213. See, e.g., General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183.
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cases and establishing coherent legal rules might free first-instance
tribunals to center their own efforts on developing a factual record and
clarifying issues in dispute. 214 But any benefit of such a focus would
accrue only in a resource-constrained world, and it is unlikely to help
matters if a first-instance tribunal consistently gets the facts right but
the law wrong.
In sum, the broad and general nature of evidentiary frameworks,
the impediments to rule creation, and the highly circumscribed nature
of appellate review of fact questions together limit the capacity of
an appellate mechanism to instill consistency and predictability in
fact-finding. 215
C.

The Effects of an Investment Court on
Subject-Matter Expertise

It is possible to construct a third argument in favor of enhancing
the influence of institutions and institutional actors in fact-finding:
that decision-makers who participate in a standing judicial body, enjoy
terms beyond a single dispute, and have access to the resources of
an administrative apparatus will develop specialized expertise inand become better able to handle-complex, routinely encountered
subjects. 216
There is some logic to the argument that an investment court
affords decision-makers and institution staff the opportunity to
develop specialized knowledge on issues that frequently arise on the
court's docket. 217 It seems reasonable to assume that experience gained
through handling complex evidence may over time result in improved
2 18
Accorddecisions on complex topics such as damages calculations.
ingly, adjudicators and their staff might develop this expertise as
a simple consequence of performing their duties, or they may do it
219
strategically to attract new cases to a mechanism.
Despite the argument's intuitive appeal, however, designers of
dispute settlement mechanisms cannot depend on the organic development of institutional expertise to increase the quality of factfinding. For one, participation in dispute settlement does not provide
214. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521,
1607 (2005).
215. See Legum, supra note 209, at 237.
216. See Brewer, supra note 3, at 1539; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 29, at 948-49.
217. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 29, at 25.
218. Brewer, supra note 3, at 1680 ("Perhaps some judges, by virtue of background or
repeat 'on the bench' experience with scientific evidence, will become sufficiently epistemically competent to render decisions about scientific expert testimony that are epistemically
legitimate and that meets the demands of intellectual due process.").
219. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 29, at 948-49.
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the type of systematic training that is necessary to obtain meaningful
expertise in most specialized areas.220 This is especially true given that
most institutions are unlikely to adjudicate disputes at a frequency
sufficient to enable decision-makers to develop expertise over the
course of a judicial tenure period, even one that may extend to ten or
twelve years, as in CETA.221 Although CETA contemplates an eventual
transition to a multilateral investment court, which would presumably
increase the system's workload, any investment court will exist, at
least for a time, as a bilateral arrangement with a relatively low
frequency of disputes. 2 2 And relying on experience obtained while
acting as an adjudicator in a system means that, even in ideal circumstances, disputes early in an adjudicator's tenure cannot benefit
from that experience. A system will realize any benefits only after an
initial learning period.
Finally, individual arbitrators participating in existing investorstate dispute settlement mechanisms may already have opportunities
to develop subject-matter expertise in frequently encountered subjects
like damages calculations-without the enhanced institutionalism
of an investment court.2 2 3 If it is possible, then, to gain expertise
through repeated exposure to complex subjects in the course of dispute
settlement, at least some arbitrators are already operating as experts
in some subject matters.2 2
IV.

4

RULES-BASED APPROACHES TO
IMPROVING FACT-FINDING

The foregoing analysis finds no clear support for arguments
that greater institutionalism in the form of an investment court
will improve fact-finding. An investment court is unlikely to lead to
reliance on more reliable evidentiary sources and methods, greater
consistency and predictability in fact-finding, or enhanced subjectmatter expertise in decision-making. A transition to an investment
court may instead increase fact-finding quality in certain ways,
while detracting from that quality in others. At the same time, an investment court is likely to decrease dispute settlement efficiency.
And yet, as noted in Part I, improvement in fact-finding is needed
across the range of dispute settlement mechanisms. If an investment
220. See Brewer, supranote 3, at 1680 (arguing that judges are unlikely to develop meaningful specialized knowledge unless they are "routinely and systematically trained in scientific theories and methods").
221. Cf. Guzman, supra note 29, at 206 (presenting a similar argument with respect to
the possibility of improved reputation over judicial tenure periods).
222. Cf. id.
223. See Georgios Dimitropoulos, Constructingthe Independence of InternationalInvestment Arbitrators:Past, Present, and Future, 36 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 371, 375-76 (2016).
224. See Franck et al., supra note 30, at 1119.
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court will not address this concern, both investment-court proponents
and detractors would do well to examine other ways to improve factfinding. The remainder of this Article puts forward a menu of alternatives that would focus on changes to the other primary lever-aside
from institutionalism- that is available to reformers: the evidentiary
rules contained in international agreements, institutional frameworks, and ad hoc arbitration arrangements.
A.

Measuring the Efficacy of
Rules-Based Approaches

Legal agreements-including international agreements, institutional frameworks, and ad hoc agreements to arbitrate-are written
down for many reasons, including a belief on the part of the negotiators
that the written text will have a constraining influence on decision5
makers when the agreement is later interpreted.22 As explained in
Part II.B, the constraining influence of written text not only promotes
fealty to designers of international legal mechanisms in individual
disputes, it also tends to support consistency and predictability across
disputes in a system. Written text that is relatively specific will exert
226
more constraining influence than relatively general text.
Today's evidentiary frameworks in international law are relatively
broad and general as compared, at least, to substantive legal rules,
27
Even
and so have less constraining influence than those rules.
though the focus of legal scholarship has been on other aspects of international dispute settlement, there is widespread acknowledgment
that the constraining influence of procedural and evidentiary rules is
a fundamental feature of international law. Laurence Helfer and
Anne-Marie Slaughter have argued that procedural and evidentiary
rules operate as "structural ex ante controls" that states impose on
international dispute resolution. 22 Gary Born has attributed what he
perceives as the relatively higher quality of evidence production in
international commercial and investment arbitration, the WTO, and
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to rules-based procedures that "have
been designed to facilitate the effective presentation and evaluation of

225. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 29, at 945-46 (arguing that written text is a
form of ex ante control over international adjudicators).
226. See id.
227. See supra Part L.B.
228. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 29, at 946-47.
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factual evidence." 229 Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark Pollack have emphasized
the role that rules play in how decision-makers express their decisions
in writing. 3 0
The idea is not that evidentiary rules can guarantee that a decisionmaker will in all cases adhere to them exactly as a state may have
intended. 231 The goal of evidentiary rules is instead to increase the intellectual rigor and quality of the information provided in a decision
by requiring decision-makers to justify any deviations from the rules,
imposing reputational, reappointment, or other costs on decisionmakers for flimsy justifications, and insulating decision-makers when
they make decisions consistent with the rules but unpopular with the
disputing parties. 23 2
The failure of existing procedural and evidentiary rules to address
the challenges of today's factually complex disputes is clear, as described in Part I.B. The prevailing practices of existing mechanisms
nevertheless confirm the capacity of evidentiary rules to influence
fact-finding, while suggesting that the generality of today's rules may
limit that influence and help explain their collective shortcomings.
To affect adjudicator behavior, evidentiary rules must overcome
competition from other influences on that behavior, including an array
of background evidentiary norms against which dispute settlement
systems operate. 3 3 These norms are embodied in both general
principles of international law and practices derived from civil law and
common law traditions.2 3 4

As a formal matter, evidentiary norms remain subject to express
rules embodied in international agreements, institutional rules, or ad

229.
230.
judicial
231.
232.
233.
234.

See Born, supra note 29, at 846, 851, 874.
Dunoff & Pollack, supranote 38, at 254-56 (describing the influence of ICJ rules on
identifiability in written decisions).
See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 29, at 946-47.
See id.
See ALTER, supra note 38 at 11; Park, supra note 45, at 35.
See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND

MATERIALS 1-2 (2001) (describing evidentiary norms in commercial arbitration). Evidentiary
norms may also change as litigants become more sophisticated in their arguments and strategies, and their disputes may become more complex. See David J. McLean, Toward a New
InternationalDispute Resolution Paradigm:Assessing the Congruent Evolution of Globalization and InternationalArbitration, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1087, 1096 (2009) (describing the effects of an increase in dispute complexity); Paulsson, supra note 84, at 2 (describing
the effects of an increase in litigant sophistication). Decision-makers and counsel who serve
in disputes in more than one mechanism may transmit practices from one to the other, bringing with them their domestic legal traditions as well as their experiences from multiple
mechanisms. See Born, supra note 29, at 835 ("In practice, the procedures used in international commercial arbitration are the model for investment arbitration, including the number and selection of arbitrators, the presentation of evidence, the conduct of hearings, and

the awards-in part because of overlaps in the individuals and law firms that serve as arbitrators and counsel in both sets of proceedings.").
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hoc arbitration arrangements. 2 5 Absent a rule to the contrary, those
norms provide that decision-makers may generally exercise "complete
freedom in the admission and evaluation of evidence."2 3 6 There is,
nonetheless, a preference in the background norms of evidence
themselves that an international court or tribunal should follow
certain guardrails, including by erring on the side of allowing the
23
production of party-produced evidence, including expert testimony, 1
and retaining the ability to seek independent assistance from
experts. 238 The influence of domestic civil law traditions may also
create countervailing tendencies for adjudicators in some mechanisms
to play a more central role in evidence production. 23 9 But, because
these guardrails are also norms or institutional tendencies, they too
remain formally subject to the existence of express evidentiary rules
that provide otherwise.240
A number of examples from existing dispute settlement mechanisms illustrate how evidentiary rules do influence fact-finding in
practice, including in ways that have overcome background norms.
Take, for example, the observation that the WTO is the only mechanism considered here that does not contemplate the presentation of
witness testimony and cross-examination at a hearing. 24 1 The WTO's
highly structured fact-finding procedures instead channel factual
development primarily through party-submission of written evidence,
rather than oral testimony. As a result, the practical function of
oral hearings in the WTO is "mainly to provide an opportunity to
clarify issues and focus the discussion on the questions which the
panel believes are the most important."2 4 2 ICJ disputes are, and many
older state-to-state arbitrations were, also subject to structured rules
channeling fact-finding through written procedures.2 43 It appears that
highly structured rules, then, may have played a role in causing these
235. See CHENG, supra note 162, at 307.
236. See id.
237. See SANDIFER, supra note 28, at 328 ("A practice that disregards available means of
resolving hotly contested questions of fact is not one calculated to inspire the confidence of
prospective litigants in international tribunals.").
238.

See WHITE, supra note 64, at 7.

239. Domestic legal traditions may contribute to norm creation, because they may be
transmitted organically to international law partly through the "natureof the personnel of
the tribunals," SANDIFER, supra note 28, at 11-12, and partly through the practitioners representing the disputing parties, Hanotiau, supra note 85, at 99. But adjudicators in both
common law and civil law jurisdictions are "in the main dependent upon the parties for the
presentation and development of the facts essential to the case." See SANDIFER, supra note

28, at 113; see also WHITE, supra note 64, at 10; GRANDO, supra note 142, at 44.
240. See SANDIFER, supra note 28, at 7, 335.
241. See Born, supra note 29, at 874-75.
242. GRANDO, supra note 142, at 246-47; see also Swinehart, supra note 48, at 288-99.
243. See Born, supra note 29, at 875-76, 876 n.405 (noting, however, that the WTO's
evidentiary procedures are nonetheless more effective than those in the ICJ).

324

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:279

decision-makers to deviate from the norms of flexible evidence-taking
practices, although there are no doubt other influences at work.
Evidentiary rules that specifically empower adjudicators to rely on
adjudicator-appointed experts also appear to increase the likelihood
that a decision-maker will actually appoint and rely on one. Although
known for using panel-appointed experts more often than other
systems, 244 the WTO has appointed experts in only a small minority
of cases 2 45 and usually in cases involving scientific issues under the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreement, 246 which,
unlike most other provisions of WTO agreement text, by its own
terms expresses a preference for consultation with panel-appointed
experts. 24 7 Decision-makers in recent PCA state-to-state arbitrations
and ITLOS cases have also appointed their own experts, specifically
citing the authority to do so under applicable rules. 248
Similarly, the likelihood of consultations with international organizations and other third-parties is increased when rules specifically
permit it, as seen most prominently in the WTO. 249 Adjudicators in
investment arbitrations also have increasingly allowed international
organizations and other third-parties to make submissions2 5 0 under
the authorization of specific rules. 2 1

244. GRANDO, supra note 142, at 298-09.
245. See Gros, supra note 157, at 352-53 (counting 15 panels that appointed experts out
of 225 adopted panel reports, "almost exclusively in SPS cases").
246. See id.
247. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 11.2,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 ("In a dispute under this Agreement involving scientific or technical
issues, a panel should seek advice from experts chosen by the panel.").
248. See, e.g., Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arb. (Bangl. v. India), PCA Case Repository 2010-16, ¶¶ 15-17 (2014); Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and
Around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), Case No. 12, Order of Oct. 8, 2003, 7 ITLOS
Rep. 10, 17. Proposed amendments to the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings would specifically authorize tribunals to appoint their own experts and could result in
greater use of tribunal-appointed experts in investment arbitration. See ICSID Secretariat,

Volume 3: Proposalsfor Amendment of the ICSID Rules-Working Paper 202 (Int'l Ctr. for
Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Working Paper No. 1, 2018), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/AmendmentsVol 3_CompleteWP+Schedules.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8Q4-63HX].
249.

See FOSTER, supra note 49, at 102-06.

250. See, e.g., Philip Morris Brands Sirl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Award, IT 74, 87, 91, 141, 306, 362, 391, 394, 404, 407 (July 8, 2016), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1000/DC9012_En.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AXD6-6636] (relying on input from the World Health Organization).
251. See Philip Morris Brands Sirl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., Written Submission
(Amicus Curiae Brief) by the World Health Organization and the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Secretariat, ¶ 1 (Jan. 28, 2015), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/
icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1000/DC9032_En.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3VWR-DAA6]
(citing Article 37 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, which expressly vests a tribunal with the
authority to accept and consider non-disputing party submissions).
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But the generality of today's evidentiary rules often means that
decision-makers continue to rely on norms or to invent their own
practices to fill gaps where no rule expressly encourages or discourages
a practice and even to justify actions that may conflict with express
rules. The continuing influence of these adjudicator-made evidentiary
norms may explain practices such as the WTO's tendency to hear
expert testimony in the form of party delegates, despite the lack of
5 2
It may also
express rules authorizing party-appointed experts.
explain why some adjudicators have appointed their own experts even
without express authorization to do so. 2 3 And the controlling influence
of norms--or the influence of domestic legal traditions at least-may
contribute to the ICJ's reluctance to produce evidence through oral
hearings and witness testimony,2 " despite rules that provide for the
examination of witnesses and oral hearings with the full participation
of the parties. 25
B. Implementing Rules-Based Approaches
Because evidentiary rules can influence fact-finding practices, they
could serve as tools for reformers hoping to increase the legitimacy of
fact-finding. This Part sets out two categories of the most promising
rules-based approaches. Approaches in the first category would seek
to improve the production, testing, and evaluation of evidence by
creating "analytical frameworks"-collections of guidelines or rules
for fact-finding that are more specific than those in existence today.
Approaches in the second category would seek to enhance the capacity
of decision-makers to assess the reliability of complex evidence by
encouraging or requiring the appointment of subject-matter experts as
adjudicators.
The objective here is to provide mechanism designers with a scalable menu of options to improve fact-finding quality while preserving
the flexibility of decision-makers to adapt to the needs of particular
disputes and avoiding material efficiency costs. Unlike the decision to
create or join an investment court, a rules-based approach is scalable
because states can adopt rule changes incrementally, measure their
effects, and adjust over time in an iterative process of reform. A
252. Pauwelyn, supra note 166, at 235.
253. See, e.g., Guyana v. Suriname, PCA Case Repository 2004-04, ¶ 47 (2007) (noting
that the tribunal had appointed its own expert, although the pre-existing rules of procedure
under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea state only that a
tribunal may follow its own rules of procedure).
254. See Born, supra note 29, at 875-76. Ad hoc state-to-state arbitrations have often
relied on similar practices. See James Crawford, Advocacy Before the InternationalCourt of
Justice and OtherInternationalTribunals in State-to-State Cases, in THE ART OF ADVOCACY
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 12-13 (R.D. Bishop ed., 2004).
255.

See SANDIFER, supra note 28, at 162.
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properly tailored rules-based approach would also remain flexible
because it would permit decision-makers to adapt to the particular
needs of a dispute but would impose costs on decision-makers for
adaptations that it cannot justify.
A rules-based approach is unlikely to impose material efficiency
costs because, unlike an investment court's introduction of substantive
appellate review, rules can change behavior without adding
procedural steps or imposing new costs on disputing parties.2 " Rule
changes can even streamline fact-finding processes by harmonizing
expectations of disputing parties and decision-makers and discouraging wasteful and unnecessary practices. This is the logic underlying
certain existing rules, like page limits on party submissions and
adjudicator awards, that mechanisms already employ to some degree.
A rules-based approach will not make sense in every context of
course. Mechanism designers will need to weigh whether the benefit
of injecting more specificity into evidentiary rules is worth the
additional negotiating time that is likely required to reach agreement
on the added detail.25 7 And they will also need to weigh the benefits
of ratcheting up the strictures of rules against the needs of decisionmakers to adapt evidentiary processes to the demands of a particular
dispute. 25 8
1. EstablishingAnalytical Frameworks
A first category of rules-based approaches would clarify and
specify in greater detail expectations for the production, testing, and
evaluation of expert evidence. 2 9 These "analytical frameworks" could
improve fact-finding in a number of ways.

256. See, e.g., Edna Sussman, Arbitrator Decision-Making: Unconscious Psychological
Influences and What You Can Do About Them, 24 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 487, 514 (2013) (noting
that certain procedural steps taken to improve quality "do not take any more time or cost

any more money"); Franck et al., supra note 30, at 1173 (arguing that the perceived tension
between "efficiency and accuracy" may be "more theoretical than real" with respect to "procedural innovations").

257. See Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO DisputeResolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J.
333, 346-50 (1999).
258. See Charles N. Brower, Evidence Before InternationalTribunals: The Need for Some
Standard Rules, 28 INT'L LAw. 47, 58 (1994); Born, supranote 29, at 874.
259. See Franck et al., supra note 30, at 1171-73 (outlining a number of procedural rules
that may improve the quality of decision-making). Reformers can implement analytical
frameworks in a variety of ways. Parties to an investment treaty or an ad hoc agreement to

submit a dispute to arbitration could decide in those documents to exercise more control over
the fact-finding practices of future adjudicators. Or, institutions might adopt analytical
frameworks either as standard procedure or as part of optional facilities, to demonstrate a

commitment to competency in fact-finding. An institution could market itself through such
a framework as more competent in questions of damages or questions of particular areas of
science, competing with other institutions to provide evidentiary rules optimized for particular types of disputes.
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First, an analytical framework could encourage fact-finding
practices that tend to increase quality by allowing a decision-maker
to rely on pre-existing rules in support of decisions that adhere to
the intentions of the system's designers; but that might-without
a written rule-prove unpopular with a disputing party or appear
arbitrary or biased. 6 0 This might provide a dependent decision-maker
(on the lower end of the Modified Posner-Yoo scale) with a type of
added "independence" in its handling of evidence.
Second, the added specificity of an analytical framework could
also discourage practices that tend to decrease quality by requiring
decision-makers to justify in more detail any deviations from the
26
framework's constraints. ' The enhanced transparency that would

result could create incentives for decision-makers, including independent ones with self-reliant tendencies, to adhere to practices that
produce higher quality evidence.
Third, an analytical framework could improve consistency and predictability in fact-finding by adding specificity to written rules and
guidelines for fact-finding practices. 26 2 This could fill a gap in promoting consistency and predictability in fact-finding that is left un22
addressed through an institution-based approach.
It is possible to divide analytical frameworks along the same
lines used before to describe the two components of fact-finding: (1)
production and testing and (2) evaluation. Analytical frameworks of
one type focus on improving the production and testing component of
fact-finding, while frameworks of a second type center on addressing
deficiencies in the evaluation component of fact-finding. The following
considers the most promising approaches in both of these categories.
Production and Testing Rules-Many earlier rules-based reforms
have focused on evidence production and testing, often with a focus
on improving a decision-maker's procedural administration of the
adversarial process. Those reforms emphasize the use of basic guidelines on the mechanics of evidence production, such as those in the
IBA's Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration,
expansion of expert conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements, and
allowance for joint evaluations of competing experts during hearings.26
260. See, e.g., Paulsson, supra note 84, at 3 ("[In international commercial arbitration,]
the arbitrator's much-vaunted freedom to adopt procedures as he sees fit is cramped by the
vehemence of the parties' procedural arguments; in order not to appear biased, arbitrators
more and more often prefer to justify procedural rulings by reference to pre-existing rules

rather than their own discretion.").
261. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 29, at 994-96; Paulsson, supra note 84, at 3.
262.

See, e.g., Brower, supra note 258, at 47.

263.
264.

See supra Part II.B.
See Hanotiau, supra note 84, at 101-02.
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Proposals for further reform would continue a push toward greater
specificity and accountability in the production and testing of evidence.
These include proposals to impose additional requirements on the
disputing parties in their presentation of evidence. The preeminent
example of such an approach is Susan Franck's proposal to require
investors "to plead damages with specificity at an early phase (or
otherwise provide detailed expert reports in advance) to justify
amounts claimed" in order to "minimize the pernicious effect of anchoring"-the tendency of people to rely on an initial value that is readily
available, which "anchors" subsequent decisions. 25 The merit of efforts
aimed at the production and testing of evidence is that they may
increase the transparency of the evidence-gathering process, sharpen
points of disagreement, and highlight obvious sources of apparent or
actual biases.1 6

Production and testing rules can also calibrate the degree of
decision-maker involvement in the production and testing of evidence
while preserving the right of parties to participate in the process. This
can have either an expansionary or constraining effect on evidence
production and testing, depending on the objectives of the rule drafter.
Figure 4 below illustrates the effects that "rules of expansion" and
"rules of constraint" may have on one stylized aspect of evidence
production, the volume of evidence, set against the competing
influence of decision-maker independence.
In this stylized universe, "rules of expansion" include any rules that
expand the factual record beyond what an evidentiary process would
produce in the normal course absent such rules. A mechanism designer
might choose a rule of expansion if it considers that the relative
independence of a decision-maker, for example, may result in "too
little" party-produced evidence. By contrast, "rules of constraint"
include any rules that tend to reduce the size of the factual record.2 6 7
A mechanism designer might choose a rule of constraint if it wishes to
prevent the parties from producing significant amounts of irrelevant

265. See Franck et al., supra note 30, at 1171-73 (recommending this change based on
an empirical study of the analytical performance of international arbitrators).
266. See Swinehart, supra note 48, at 303-05. The authority of a decision-maker to appoint its own expert is nothing new, but some recent reforms that fall into this category have
included proposals to strengthen or include express appointment authority in evidentiary
rules. See id. Although a decision-maker's appointment of its own expert may avoid a battle
between competing party-appointed experts, that appointment process usually involves a
debate between the parties that is just as contentious and fraught. See IRMGARD MARBOE,
CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 182
(2009). It also begs the question whether the decision-maker has the capacity to choose an
appropriate expert in a subject in which the decision-maker has no expertise. See Brewer,
supra note 3, at 1681. A decision-maker's appointment of an expert witness also heightens
concerns of outsourcing decision-making authority. See Riddell, supra note 78, at 857.
267. GRANDO, supra note 142, at 306-07.
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information,268 or the decision-maker from engaging in its own
26 9
development of evidence without proper due process protections.
In Figure 4, the baseline case for evidence production, P, represents
a mechanism with no rules of expansion or constraint, where the
volume of evidence is assumed to depend solely on the mechanism's
degree of independence, based notionally on the conclusions made
about self-reliance in Part II.A. The effects of expansionary rules are
illustrated with the case PE, with the resulting increase in volume
labeled AE. The effects of constraining rules are illustrated with the
case Pc and the resulting decrease in volume labeled Ac.
The point of this illustration is that mechanism designers can use
analytical frameworks to calibrate mechanism outputs-like the
highly stylized example of evidence volume. In doing so, it might
choose to compensate for the countervailing influences of other mechanism inputs, such as elements that increase independence. The
illustration does not describe a precise relationship between volume,
independence, rules, or any other design inputs or outputs.
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Figure 4: Model of the Effects of Rules of Expansion (AE) and
Constraint (Ac) on Volume of Evidence Produced

Evaluation Rules-Analytical framework proposals that address
the evaluation component of fact-finding center on ensuring that
decision-makers assess and accord weight to evidence based on its
reliability. The objective of these proposals is to improve the analytical

268. Id.
269. A type of constraining rule could provide at least a partial solution to the problem
of judicial fact-finding and reliance on unseen actors that Part II.A identified. Such a rule
could prohibit expressly the production of any evidence without the agreement and participation of the parties. Similar prohibitions exist in some domestic legal systems, albeit with
imperfect success rates. See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge:
Ethical Limits on Independent Research, 28 REV. LITIG. 131 (2008).
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rigor of the adjudicator's evaluation of that evidence 7 0 by requiring
more detailed and precise approaches to decision-making 27' and
ensuring that decision-makers "really do what they say they will do
and consciously weigh the reliability of evidence."2 7 2 It is by now
well-recognized that such substantive engagement is critical to the
evaluation component of fact-finding, given the challenges associated
with party-presentation of evidence1 7 1 and the complexity of the questions presented in today's international disputes. 7 4
My own proposal in this category is for adjudicators to use a
reliability checklist, a short framework of questions to ask of expert
witnesses and others seeking to provide specialized information
outside the competency and training of arbitrators and judges. 7 5 The
engineering, medical, and airline industries all use checklists to
create analytical processes that receive and make use of information
in a careful and efficient manner, without imposing constraints on
decision-makers to adapt to new circumstances.27 6
With respect to expert evidence, a checklist approach could provide
the basis for an analytical process that is focused on the reliability
of an expert's methodology and the application of that methodology to
the facts of a dispute.27 7 An adjudicator would then determine how
much weight to afford expert evidence based on its reliability. 278 Best
practices in international disputes over the years suggest a relatively
small set of useful questions that adjudicators should ask, such as
whether a legal rule obviates the need for expert evidence altogether
and whether an expert's methodology was applied within practical
and theoretical boundaries as recognized in the expert's field.2 79 Each
question in the checklist could be designed as a proxy that is accessible
to those with legal training and experience, without requiring that
the decision-maker become an arbiter of competing claims of truth in
specialized areas.21 0

The overall objective of a reliability checklist would be to impose
an ex ante structure that makes adjudicators more likely to engage
270. See Swinehart, supra note 48, at 318-20.
271. See Franck et al., supra note 30, at 1172.
272. See Sussman, supra note 256, at 493.
273. GRANDO, supra note 142, at 16 ("[U]nchecked participation is not necessary to
achieve accurate outcomes; to the contrary, it might make the proceedings more prone to

errors.").
274. RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 56, at 190-91.
275. See Swinehart, supra note 48, at 320-46.
276.

See ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO 39 (2009).

277.
278.
279.
280.

See
See
See
See

Swinehart, supra note 48, at 318.
id. at 320-21.
id. at 318-46.
id. at 320-21.
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with the substance of complex evidence. 281 When coupled with a
requirement to apply the checklist in a reasoned decision, to explain
how and why an adjudicator has chosen to rely on certain sources of
evidence but not others, a checklist could also improve the rigor and
transparency of the evidence-taking process, heighten accountability,
28 2
and increase the consistency and predictability of fact-finding.
One possible model checklist for evaluating the reliability of expert
evidence is set out in an appendix to this Article.
2. Appointing Subject-MatterExperts as Adjudicators
A second category of rules-based approaches involves the appointment of one or more subject-matter experts as adjudicators. Scott
Brewer endorsed this "two-hat" decision-maker strategy twenty
years ago in the U.S. context. 28 3 This approach draws in part from
experience with domestic administrative proceedings, which are
28 4
thought to benefit from specialized expertise in some circumstances.
A variation of the two-hat approach involves the appointment of a
"special master" to consider and make determinations on predicate
factual questions. Those determinations are then binding on the overall decision-maker. 28 5
Appointing subject-matter experts as adjudicators could improve
fact-finding in a number of ways. The approach would increase the
intellectual capacity of decision-makers to evaluate complex factual
questions, without the challenge of training them on the job, as identified in Part II.C. A subject-matter expert appointed as an adjudicator
is also more likely to actively participate in fact-finding in a way
that streamlines the production and testing processes, enhances
engagement with the substance of complex evidence, and focuses the
2
inquiry on the reliability of party-produced evidence. ss
Existing international law mechanisms already employ subjectmatter experts as adjudicators in limited circumstances. Many
mechanisms are flexible enough so that parties may appoint one or

281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See Kenneth S. Carlston, Theory of the Arbitration Process, 17 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 631, 650 (1952); Brewer, supra note 3, at 1677, 1681.
284. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 935-36 (1988).
285. See generally James R. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
247 (2018).
286. See Brewer, supra note 3, at 1677-82 (arguing that "the same person who has legal
authority must also have epistemic competence in relevant scientific disciplines" to adjudicate cases centering on scientific questions); see also RiPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 56,

at 190-91; GRANDO, supra note 142, at 16, 306-07.
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more adjudicators with specialized expertise in a particular dispute. 28 7
Arbitrators in commercial arbitrations are often appointed for their
knowledge of the relevant industry, for example. 288 And WTO panelists
are sometimes chosen in part for their backgrounds in economics. 28 9
A small minority of existing institutional rules and international
agreements also establish in advance requirements to appoint adjudicators with specialized expertise. ITLOS is an example of such an
institutional arrangement, with rules specifically providing for
subject-matter experts as adjudicators in its special chambers. 290 For
its part, ICSID has proposed an Additional Facility on Fact-Finding
Procedures that would allow the establishment of a committee devoted
to deciding factual questions, either as a standalone procedure or in
parallel to an arbitration, and contemplates that the parties may agree
that "a member" of the committee will have "particular qualifications
or expertise relevant to the subject-matter." 291
A notable dispute in which an underlying international agreement
required the appointment of a subject-matter expert as decision-maker
is the Indus Waters Kishengaga arbitration. 292 There, a 1960 treaty
required the appointment of a "[h]ighly qualified engineer[]" to the
seven-member, ad hoc "court."29 3 The parties selected a professor and
engineer whose focus on hydrology and other complex questions of civil
and environmental appears to have matched well with the issues
presented in the dispute, 294 and the court's decisions are widely
considered to reflect sound evaluation of the parties' evidence. 29
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289. See Bown, supra note 164, at 15.
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Despite their potential promise, approaches relying on the appointment of subject-matter experts as adjudicators all share a significant
limitation. Someone-whether the treaty authors, disputing parties,
third-party appointment authority, or, in the case of a special master,
the court or tribunal-must still choose a person with appropriate
expertise. Appointing subject-matter experts as adjudicators may
therefore do nothing more than move the usual debate between the
296
parties about expert input to another juncture. This difficulty may
lead parties or institutions to avoid fulfilling treaty or institutional
requirements to appoint subject-matter experts as decision-makers.
Treaty parties have, in practice, failed to populate specialized arbitral
rosters, 29 7 and disputing parties and institutions have failed to appoint
decision-makers with specialized expertise in specific cases when
298
required under treaties or institutional rules.
A further difficulty is that the appointment of subject-matter
experts as adjudicators is unlikely to obviate the need for reliable
evidence from expert witnesses and other sources, given that a single
299
dispute often involves complex topics in a number of sub-specialties.
An expert decision-maker with training or experience in environmental science could help in a case analyzing, say, the effects of climate
change, but would encounter a number of unfamiliar sub-specialties.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, for example, has
working groups that draw from such diverse and highly specialized
sub-specialties as biogeochemistry, climate modeling, and greenhouse
gas removal.oo Appointment of a subject-matter expert to a court or
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tribunal, then, is unlikely to substitute, or obviate the need, for partyappointed expert witnesses and other expert evidence gathered in an
effort to address the specifics of a dispute.
This last Part has set out a menu of rules-based approaches, divided
into two categories, for designers of dispute settlement mechanisms
that wish to improve fact-finding. Both categories-analytical frameworks that would increase the specificity of evidentiary rules and the
appointment of subject-matter experts as adjudicators-offer potential
means of improving fact-finding without requiring wholesale reform.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article is not a holistic appraisal of the investment-court movement. But it has raised for the first time a question that is of considerable importance to the legitimacy of any such court: will it be a better
fact-finder?
The answer given here is that neither theory nor experience
predicts that enhancing the role of institutions and institutional actors
through the creation of an investment court will improve fact-finding.
An investment court may instead decrease fact-finding quality while
imposing financial costs on the disputing parties and delaying final
resolution of disputes.
That conclusion standing alone is of course no reason to abandon
the idea of an investment court altogether. But, especially given the
high stakes intrinsic to such an ambitious reform, it should give movement adherents reason to doubt whether they have fully considered
the consequences of their efforts. At least with respect to fact-finding
quality, alternatives exist that would not require wholesale changes or
degrade efficiency. It is worth examining them.
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VI. APPENDIX

Model Analytical Framework on the Reliability of
Expert Evidence
1.

2.

For the purposes of this framework, the term "expert evidence"
means the written or oral testimony of any witness designated by
the parties or by the tribunal as an expert witness.
In determining whether to rely on expert evidence in its decisionmaking, the Tribunal shall consider the reliability of that evidence,
taking into account the questions set forth in paragraph 4, as well
as any other questions as the tribunal may decide. The Tribunal
may forego the requirement to take into account one or more of the
questions set forth in paragraph 4 after consulting with the disputing parties.

3.

4.

In any award issued, the Tribunal shall set forth a description of
the expert evidence on which it has relied, the degree of weight
that it has afforded that evidence, and the bases for that weighting,
including whether and how it has taken into account the questions
set forth in paragraph 4. If the Tribunal determines to forego the
requirement in paragraph 2, it shall set forth in the award the reasons for that determination.
For the purposes of, and consistent with, paragraphs 1 through 3,
the questions to be taken into account include the following:
(a) Will expert evidence usefully aid in answering the question
presented?
(i) Does evidence other than expert evidence, or a legal rule,
obviate the need for expert evidence?
(ii) Does the expert have specialized knowledge beyond that
of the Tribunal?
(b) Does the witness have the requisite experience and training
in the chosen methodology?
(c) What methodologies does the relevant technical field consider
reliable in answering the question presented?
(d) Is the methodology underlying the expert evidence more or
less reliable than the methodology underlying other expert evidence presented?
(e) Did the expert present the expert evidence in a manner that
is useful in conveying information to a non-expert and that
clearly identifies key points of disagreement with other experts, if any?
(f) Did the expert apply the chosen methodology within practical and theoretical boundaries?
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